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Trade Screening Laws: A Survey
and Analysis
By THOMAS A. BARTASI*
I
Introduction
Since the late seventies, a battle has been taking place be-
tween motion picture distributors and exhibitors. The battle-
ground, however, is not some Hollywood soundstage; rather, it
is the floor of state legislatures. At stake is a trade practice
known as "blind" or "advance" bidding, under which exhibi-
tors negotiate and bid for the right to exhibit a motion picture
without having had an opportunity to view the picture.1 Exhib-
itors seek to end the use of blind bidding, contending that it
prevents them from making informed licensing decisions as to
the quality and nature of motion pictures before becoming con-
tractually committed to their exhibition.2 Distributors, on the
other hand, seek to preserve the practice, arguing that blind
bidding is not unfair and that it is essential to the successful
marketing and distribution of some motion pictures.
3
To date, exhibitors have been able to convince the legisla-
tures of twenty-three states to enact laws requiring distribu-
tors in some instances to screen their motion pictures to
exhibitors before the licensing process can begin.' The restric-
* B.A., University of California, Los Angeles, 1979; J.D., University of California,
Hastings College of the Law, 1983; member, California Bar.
1. Exhibitors refer to this licensing method as "blind" bidding, whereas distribu-
tors prefer the term "advance" bidding. Although no motion picture is actually li-
censed "blind" since a distributor provides exhibitors with information about a picture
prior to licensing, for purposes of this note, this licensing method will be referred to by
its more frequently used term "blind bidding." See infra notes 42-52 and accompany-
ing text.
2. See infra notes 46-50 and accompanying text. The lobbying efforts of exhibitors
have largely been directed by the National Association of Theater Owners (NATO)
through its state affiliates. See infra note 14.
3. See infra notes 45 and 51 and accompanying text. The lobbying efforts of the
major motion picture distribution companies have been directed by their trade associ-
ation, the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA). See infra note 11 and ac-
companying text.
4. See infra note 60.
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tions and prohibitions contained in these "trade screening
laws" differ in scope and detail from state to state. In addition
to restricting the use of blind bidding, many laws limit the use
of certain licensing terms and require distributors to follow
specific bidding guidelines and procedures once bids have
been solicited from exhibitors. This legislative battle between
exhibitors and distributors is far from being over. While
twenty-seven states still do not regulate the use of blind bid-
ding, repeal legislation has surfaced in several states6 and the
constitutionality of three laws is presently before the courts.7
Whether there is a legitimate need for states to regulate the
motion picture licensing process is an issue that has been sub-
ject to much debate among exhibitors, distributors, legislators,
and commentators.' This note does not attempt to resolve this
controversy. Rather, its purpose is to provide legislators con-
templating the enactment or revision of trade screening legis-
lation with a detailed survey of state trade screening laws and
discussion of various drafting alternatives. Following a brief
background discussion of the operational structure of the mo-
tion picture industry and licensing process, the note then fo-
cuses on trade screening legislation. It analyzes the
differences among the various trade screening laws by group-
ing the twenty-three laws into three separate categories. The
response of distributors to the enactment of these laws and
their alleged effect on the licensing process are also noted. Fi-
nally, the note suggests possible alternatives to the common
provisions contained in these laws.
5. These laws have also been referred to as "anti-blind bidding laws," "motion
picture licensing acts," and "motion picture fair competition acts."
6. See infra note 138.
7. See infra note 109.
8. One commentator has concluded that state regulation of blind bidding is un-
wise and unwarranted, Note, Blind Bidding and the Motion Picture Industry, 92 HARV.
L. REV. 1128, 1147 (1979). Another commentator has concluded that such laws are war-
ranted and necessary to promote the fair and efficient operation of the motion picture
industry, Statfeld, Blind Bidding: or What Should be Playing at the Bijou? 11 PERF.
ARTS REV. 27, 56 (1981). For a thorough discussion regarding the business aspects of
blind bidding and the arguments raised both for and against its use, see Statfeld,




The Motion Picture Industry:
Structure and Licensing
A. The Distributor-Exhibitor Relationship
The motion picture industry is a worldwide, billion dollar
business, attracting over a billion movie-goers annually.' The
operational structure of the industry can be divided into three
basic components: production, distribution, and exhibition. In
general, production encompasses the-actual manufacturing of
a motion picture from script to final print; distribution refers to
the marketing, licensing, and dissemination of the picture to
exhibitors; and exhibition consists of the public display of the
picture in theatres and drive-ins. 10 The production and distri-
bution components have become integrated over the years and
are presently dominated by a few major companies." These
companies are the primary source of first-run motion pictures
for exhibitors. 2 The exhibition component is not significantly
integrated with either the production or distribution arms of
9. Domestic theatre attendance for 1982 was estimated to be 1.165 billion, with
projected box office receipts totaling $3.449 billion. Murphy, Dollar Recordfor '82 U.S.
B.O., Daily Variety, Jan. 12, 1983, at 1, col. 4. For a proffle of the movie-going public and
an economic review of the motion picture industry covering 1981, see Industry Eco-
nomic Review and Audience Profile, in THE MOVIE BusINEss BOOK 353 (J. Squire ed.
1983).
10. Unless otherwise noted, "theatre" as used throughout this survey includes
both walk-in and drive-in theatres, and "exhibitor" includes both walk-in and drive-in
owners.
11. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 414 (S.D. Ohio 1980)
(constitutional challenge of the Ohio trade screening law by distributors), affd in part,
remanded in part, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982). The major production-distribution com-
panies are Universal Pictures Division of Universal City Studios, Inc., Paramount Pic-
tures Corporation, Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corporation, MGM/UA
Entertainment Company, Warner Brothers, Inc., Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc.,
and Walt Disney Productions/Buena Vista Distribution Company. These major com-
panies either finance, produce and distribute their own motion pictures or provide
financing, distribution, or both for independent producers. See generally Freedman,
Indies, Majors Learn to Work Together to Meet Challenges of Changing Industry, The
Hollywood Reporter, Aug. 9, 1983, at S-13, col. 1. Motion pictures distributed by the
major companies accounted for a 93% share of U.S.-Canadian film rentals in 1982. Mur-
phy, U the Big 1982 Rentals Winner, Daily Variety, Jan. 13, 1983, at 1, col. 4. For a dis-
cussion of a major production-distribution company's role in the motion picture
industry, see Myers, The Studio as Distributor, in THE MOVIE BUSINEss BOOK 275 (J.
Squire ed. 1983). The Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) is the represen-
tative and lobbying organization of these major companies.
12. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 496 F. Supp. at 414. Other sources of motion pic-
tures include numerous domestic and foreign production and distribution companies.
For a breakdown and discussion of motion picture production between the major and
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the industry,13 and is less concentrated on a national level, va-
rying from nationwide and regional chains to individually
owned and operated theatres.14 Structurally, however, the ex-
hibition component operates in geographical markets wherein
theatre ownership can be highly concentrated.
15
independent production companies, see Cohn, Cutback in Majors' Prod'n Giving In-
dies Chance to Fill in Missing Spaces, Daily Variety, May 5, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
13. Although each component operated separately and independently during the
early years of the industry, integration gradually occurred until the major production-
distribution companies owned major interests in the nation's first-run theatres. For a
discussion of the development of the motion picture industry in its early years (1900-
1940), see Arbitration in the Motion Picture Industry: Introduction to the Industry, 5
ARB. J. 10 (1941) [hereinafter cited as Introduction to the Industry]. However, as a
result of antitrust litigation during the 1940's, the major companies were required to
divest themselves of their theatre ownership and were enjoined from using several
anticompetitive marketing practices. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 70 F.
Supp. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1947), affd in part, rev'd in part, 334 U.S. 131 (1948), on remand, 85
F. Supp. 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1949), affd sub nom, United States v. Loew's Inc., 339 U.S. 974
(1950). See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 1980-82 TRADE CAS. (CCH)
63,553 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 1980) (an accounting of judicial activity under the Paramount
decision); see generally M. CONANT, ANTITRUST IN THE MOTION PICTURE INDUSTRY
(1960); Conant, The Paramount Decrees Reconsidered, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. no. 4
at 79 (1981); Note, An Experiment in Preventive Anti-trust. Judicial Regulation of the
Motion Picture Exhibition Market Under the Paramount Decrees, 74 YALE L.J. 1041
(1965); Cassady, Impact of the Paramount Decision on Motion Picture Distribution and
Price Making, 31 S. CAL. L. REV. 150 (1958). Although the defendant-distributors are
barred from theatre ownership under the Paramount decision, several exhibitors have
periodically engaged in motion picture financing and distribution (but before any cor-
poration succeeding to the theatre circuits of the defendant-distributors can engage in
the production or distribution of motion pictures, the Paramount decrees require that
it obtain special permission from the presiding district court). See Conant, supra, at
94-95. The Department of Justice is presently reviewing the Paramount decrees to de-
termine whether separation of the distribution and exhibition components is still nec-
essary. Robbins, Justice Action May Open Door to Studios Owning Theatres, Daily
Variety, July 8, 1983, at 1, col. 1. For a summary discussion of antitrust considerations
in the motion picture industry, see H. SWERDLOW & J. JAFFE, Current Antitrust Aspects
of the Distribution/Exhibition Relationship, in THE SELLING OF MOTION PICTURES IN
THE 80's: NEW PRODUCER/DISTRIBUTOR/EXHIBITOR RELATIONSHIPS 240 (Dec. 5-6, 1980)
(available in the UCLA Law School Library).
14. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 496 F. Supp. at 414. There were 18,020 screens in
the United States in 1982. Ritzer, '82 Bonanza Year for Studios with 280 Releases; Best
Year Since '74, The Hollywood Reporter, Feb. 11, 1983, at 1, col. 2. See generally
Durwood & Resnick, The Theatre Chain: American Multi-Cinema, in THE MOVIE BUSI-
NESS BOOK 327 (J. Squire ed. 1983). The interests of the majority of exhibitors in the
United States are represented by either the National Association of Theater Owners
(NATO) and its state affiliates or the National Independent Theater Exhibitors
(NITE).
15. See, e.g., United States v. Capitol Service, Inc., No. 80-C-407 at 9-11 (E.D. Wis.
June 16, 1983) (composition of the Milwaukee exhibition market). Each exhibition
market can be further divided into sub-markets, e.g., first-run theatres, second-run or
subsequent run theatres, and limited market theatres, such as repertory, foreign and
adult theatres.
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The exhibition of motion pictures centers around the distrib-
utor-exhibitor relationship. The relationship among distribu-
tors and among exhibitors is a competitive one, whereas the
relationship between the two groups has been characterized as
a mutually-dependent one.16 On the one hand, distributors
compete against each other to have their pictures shown in
each market's best theatres at the best times, 7 while exhibi-
tors of each market compete among themselves to obtain exhi-
bition licenses for the best pictures offered by distributors. On
the other hand, a mutually-dependent relationship exists be-
tween the two in which distributors depend on exhibitors to
present their product to the movie-going public in a commer-
cially appealing manner, while exhibitors rely on the ability of
distributors to provide motion pictures that will continue to at-
tract audiences into their theatres."
Although the distributor-exhibitor relationship may be char-
acterized as being one of mutual dependence, the balance of
bargaining power has been perceived to weigh in favor of the
major distributors due to their high market concentration and
ability to control the flow of first-run motion pictures. 9 Recent
16. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 496 F. Supp. at 414.
17. Distributors compete for a limited number of prime first-run theatres within
each exhibition market. Such factors as location, size, and grossing records make cer-
tain theatres within a particular market more desirable to distributors than others. In
addition, certain time periods (Christmas, Easter and the summer months) are more
appealing to distributors because these are periods when theatre attendance tradi-
tionally peaks. See generally Biskind, The Editing Room, AM. FiLM, May 1983, at 5.
18. The mutually-dependent relationship between distributors and exhibitors has
been described as follows:
The [producer-distributors] create a product that depends on the exhibitors
for its outlet: theater owners-the exhibitors of motion pictures--control the
only available access that [producer-distributors] have to theater audiences.
Conversely, producer-distributors control the quantity and quality of the prod-
uct available to exhibitors, who consequently depend heavily on the [pro-
ducer-distributors] for production of films to show in their theaters. As with
many symbiotic relationships, the parties to it find their interests at once coin-
cide and conflict. Without the cooperation of the exhibitors, producer-distrib-
utors would be without the major market for their goods. Without the
cooperation of the producer-distributors, exhibitors would be haunted by the
spectre of the "dark screen." Thus, they depend upon one another for the
benefit of all in turning a profit.
Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 496 F. Supp. at 414-415.
19. Note, Motion Picture Licensing Acts: An Analysis of the Constitutionality of
their Provisons, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 293, 293 n.5 (1982); Statfeld, supra note 8, at 34;
Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 496 F. Supp. at 431 n. 11; Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 679
F.2d at 660. For a discussion regarding the market power held by distributors in the
entertainment industry and the source of that power, see 1 T. SELZ & M. ShIENSKY,
ENTERTAINMENT LAw §§ 6.01-.04 (1983).
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technological and market developments may further increase
the bargaining position of distributors. Although the largest
single source of motion picture-derived revenue for distribu-
tors has traditionally been film rentals from the exhibition
component, dependence on theatrical exhibition is lessening
as a result of the growth of ancillary markets in the field of
home entertainment such as home video, pay cable and over-
the-air subscription television.20 Distributors are even begin-
ning to bypass theatrical exhibition, both partially and com-
pletely, by producing made-for-pay-TV motion pictures.2
Moreover, while dependence by distributors on exhibitors les-
sens, dependence by exhibitors on distributors as their sole
source of commercially promising motion pictures has re-
mained constant with no prospect of change. Should this trend
continue, the character of the distributor-exhibitor relation-
ship may shift from one of mutual to that of unilateral
dependence.22
B. Motion Picture Licensing
23
Although exhibitors purchased motion pictures from produ-
20. See generally Landro, Paramount Pursues New Markets As Changes Confront
Movie Firms, Wall St. J., May 25, 1983, at 31, col. 4; Graham, Over $20 billion per year
seen for home entertainment by '90, The Hollywood Reporter, Sept. 7, 1982, at 1, col. 2;
Mahon, Fade-Out, Fade-In: New Technologies, Markets Have Begun to Overshadow the
Screen, BARRON'S, Apr. 13, 1981, at 4, col. 1; M. MAYER, THE FILM INDUSTRIES 88-97, 213-14
(rev. ed. 1978). For a discussion regarding the response by the exhibition component
to the growth of home entertainment, see Stabiner, The Shape of Theaters to Come, AM.
FILM, Sept. 1982, at 51. See also Morin, Movie Houses Survive Surge In Home Video,
Wall St. J., Nov. 22, 1983, at 29, col. 3.
21. Universal recently coordinated the release of the motion picture Pirates of Pen-
zance to addressable cable and subscription television concurrent with the picture's
release to theatres. See generally Schrage & Brown, The Perils of Pay-Per-View, AM.
FILM, Apr. 1983, at 17; Pollock, Studios See Bonanza in Living Room Premieres, Los
Angeles Times, July 21, 1982, pt. VI, at 1, col. 5; Disney Channel Plans Made-for-Pay
Movies, Multichannel News, Apr. 4, 1983, at 10, col. 1; Bierbaum, Disney Channel Moves
Into Made-for-Pay Film Business, Daily Variety, June 15, 1983, at 1, col. 1. Several ma-
jor studios have also indicated a willingness to participate in pay television joint ven-
tures but have experienced difficulty in receiving approval from the Department of
Justice.
22. For additional discussion on the structure and operation of the motion picture
industry, see Conant, supra note 13; M. MAYER, supra note 20; THE MOVIE BUSINESS
BOOK (J. Squire ed. 1983); Note, supra note 8, at 1129-31.
23. Since trade screening laws only regulate the licensing of motion pictures
between distributors and exhibitors, the scope of this note is limited to that licensing
relationship. However, the commercial life of a motion picture typically includes more
than exhibition licenses. A distributor will often license or sell a picture to pay
television and network television, as well as for release in videodisc and videocassette
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cers and distributors on a footage basis during the early years
of the motion picture industry, exhibitors today license or
"rent" pictures from distributors for exhibition in their thea-
tres.24 The parties enter into exhibition licensing agreements
that set forth the terms and conditions under which exhibition
of motion pictures will take place.25 These licenses are typi-
cally recorded on basic exhibition form contracts provided by
distributors.26 The financial arrangement offered by exhibitors,
along with the location and size of theatres, is the primary cri-
terion used by distributors in determining which exhibitors
should be awarded exhibition licenses. This arrangement,
among other things, sets forth the basis by which box office re-
ceipts are to be apportioned between the parties, otherwise
known as the "film rental."27 Other terms generally bargained
for and included in exhibition licenses are the playing dates
and times, the run and clearance,28 and the allocation of adver-
tising expenses.
In addition to the film rental, the payment of "front money"
in the form of guarantees and advances is sometimes included
in the licensing arrangement.29 A guarantee payment is a non-
form. The licensing of other ancillary rights, such as book-publishing and
merchandising rights, may also be undertaken. See generally Kent, Exploiting Book-
Publishing Rights, in THE MOVIE BUSINESS BOOK 86 (J. Squire ed. 1983); Blum,
Merchandising, in THE MOVIE BUSINEss BOOK at 378.
24. Introduction to the Industry, supra note 13, at 11.
25. For a thorough discussion regarding the terms and mechanics of the exhibition
license, see M. MAYER, supra note 20, at 60-65; Mayer, The Exhibition License, in THE
MOVIE BUSINESS BOOK 338 (J. Squire ed. 1983).
26. May, Sample Exhibition Contract, in THE MOVIE BUSINEss BOOK 323 (J. Squire
ed. 1983).
27. The film rental is commonly computed by a percentage arrangement (exhibitor
agrees to pay distributor a specified percentage of gross or net box office receipts) or
on a flat fee basis (exhibitor agrees to pay distributor a specified sum for the use of the
picture). Other arrangements are also possible. See Statfeld, supra note 8, at 30. The
arrangement used and the size of the percentage or rental agreed upon depends on
such factors as the location, size, and grossing record of the theatre, the length of a
picture's run, and whether a picture is in its first or second run.
28. A motion picture's run refers to the number of weeks an exhibitor agrees to
exhibit the picture. Runs can be either first, second/subsequent, or multiple. Clear-
ance is the time period between a prior and subsequent run of a picture, during which
time the distributor agrees not to license the picture to other exhibitors in the locality.
For a discussion regarding the use and effect of runs and clearances, see M. CONANT,
supra note 13, at 58-61.
29. Of the twenty-three state trade screening laws, seven restrict to some extent
the use of guarantee and advance payments in exhibition licenses. See infra notes 82-
98 and accompanying text. For a discussion regarding the general use of advance and
guarantee payments in the entertainment industry, see 1 T. SELZ & M. SIMENSKY, supra
note 19, at § 4.07.
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refundable, minimum cash figure that an exhibitor agrees to
pay a motion picture's distributor regardless of the box office
performance of the picture." This payment is generally re-
quired prior to the exhibition of the licensed motion picture
and is credited by the distributor against the film rental owed
by the exhibitor. However, due to the non-refundable charac-
ter of the guarantee payment, the exhibitor will not be able to
realize a return from the motion picture's exhibition until net
box office receipts exceed the guaranteed amount.
The primary purpose of the guarantee payment is to transfer
a portion of the high financial risks associated with the produc-
tion and distribution of motion pictures to exhibitors, thereby
assuring distributors some return on their product.3 1 In addi-
tion, since the guarantee payment is among the more competi-
tive licensing terms considered by distributors when
evaluating licensing offers, it allows new and small exhibitors,
who are usually competing without the established track
records or market strength of larger exhibitors, to break into
existing exhibition markets by offering distributors attractive
guarantee figures.3 2 Moreover, the guarantee payment pro-
vides licensing exhibitors with an incentive to undertake effec-
tive promotional campaigns. Although competition among
exhibitors for popular motion pictures necessitates the offering
of guarantee payments, the use of these payments is disfa-
vored by exhibitors because it requires them to share the risk
of unsuccessful pictures when box office receipts fail to exceed
the amount of the guarantee. This dissatisfaction is com-
pounded when the blind bidding method 33 is used by distribu-
tors to license their motion pictures because a situation is then
created in which exhibitors may have guaranteed large sums
of money for pictures they have never seen.34
By contrast, an advance payment is a refundable deposit
that distributors sometimes negotiate for or request an exhibi-
30. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 496 F. Supp. at 418; see generally Statfeld, supra
note 8, at 31-33 (discussion regarding the use and role of guarantee payments).
31. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 496 F. Supp. at 418. For a discussion regarding the
huge investment and high risk factors associated with production and distribution in
the entertainment industry, see 1 T. SELZ & M. SIMENSKY, supra note 19, at §§ 2.10-.10.
See generally Conant, supra note 13, at 82-83; Vallely, The Opening and Closing of
Heaven's Gate, ROLLING STONE, Feb. 5, 1981, at 33, col. 1 (examples of the risks and
uncertainties associated with the motion picture industry).
32. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 496 F. Supp. at 418.
33. See infra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
34. But see infra text following note 177.
[Vol. 6
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tor to make before a print of the licensed motion picture is
shipped to his theatre. This payment is subsequently applied
against the film rental owed by the exhibitor or, if the film
rental figure fails to exceed the advance payment, is refunded
to the exhibitor. The advance payment serves primarily as a
security device to assure distributors that exhibitors will sat-
isfy the terms and conditions under their exhibition licenses in
a timely manner. Poor performance by exhibitors of their pay-
ment obligations under exhibition licenses is not uncommon. 5
C. Licensing Methods
The methods used by distributors to license motion pictures
are negotiation, competitive bidding, or a combination of the
two. Licensing by negotiation can be either competitive or di-
rect. Under competitive negotiation, the distributor bargains
with selected exhibitors within a particular exhibition market,
either before or after the completion of the motion picture,
over the terms and conditions under which the picture will be
licensed. If a satisfactory agreement is reached, the parties
enter into exhibition licenses based on that agreement. In con-
trast, direct negotiation refers to the noncompetitive bargain-
ing with only one exhibitor within a market. Distributors
sometimes agree to review and adjust the terms of an exhibi-
tion license entered into under direct negotiation. Under this
agreement, if the box office performance of the licensed picture
is not commensurate with the agreed-upon terms, a review and
adjustment of those terms may be made in favor of the exhibi-
tor.3 6 The advantage of licensing pictures by negotiation is that
it enables distributors to finalize exhibition licenses within a
relatively short period of time.
Competitive bidding, although generally a more time con-
suming method of licensing, is preferred by many distributors
because they believe the competitive nature of the bidding pro-
cess results in higher rental terms. 7 Under competitive bid-
ding, the distributor notifies exhibitors within a particular
exhibition market of the availability of a motion picture for li-
35. See M. MAYER, supra note 20, at 63-64; Statfeld, supra note 8, at 39-40.
36. See infra note 177. Review and adjustment is not possible when competitive
bidding is undertaken; once a bid is accepted, the terms are final.
37. Competitive bidding may not be conducted by distributors in a discriminatory




censing and solicits bids from those exhibitors. Some exhibi-
tors may respond by declining to bid while indicating a
willingness to enter into negotiations. After evaluating the re-
turned bids, the distributor enters into exhibition licenses with
those exhibitors offering bids containing the most commer-
cially promising licensing terms and conditions. Should the
distributor be dissatisfied with the bids received, he may reject
all bids and either rebid the picture or enter into negotiations
with one or more of the bidding exhibitors or with exhibitors
who chose not to submit bids. 8
The bidding process can be either closed or open. Under
closed bidding, bids are opened privately by the licensing dis-
tributor without disclosing to exhibitors the basis used to de-
termine the winning bid.3 9 This, some exhibitors suspect,
allows distributors to conduct a practice known as the "five
o'clock look," whereby distributors give preferred treatment to
certain exhibitors notwithstanding the superiority of other
bids.40 Under open bidding, exhibitors are given the opportu-
nity to be present when bids are opened and to examine the
contents of the bids.4'
Negotiating or bidding may occur either without or after a
screening. Blind bidding, the licensing practice trade screen-
ing laws are designed to restrict, has been defined by most
trade screening laws as "the bidding for, negotiating for, or of-
fering or agreeing to terms for the licensing or exhibition of a
motion picture before that motion picture has been trade
screened for exhibitors."42
Prior to the enactment of trade screening laws, some distrib-
utors were blind bidding between sixty and ninety percent of
38. A distributor's licensing options in this situation may be restricted by trade
screening laws. See infra notes 99-108 and accompanying text.
39. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 496 F. Supp. at 430.
40. Id. Witnesses in the Allied Artists trial described the "five o'clock look":
as a situation in which the distributor, after bidding closed at the end of the
day, but before bids were examined, would phone an exhibitor to whom he
wanted to award the movie and state, for example, "The highest bid I have is
$65,000, if you can beat that, it's yours," or as a situation in which the bids were
disregarded and a distributor would strike a deal privately with a large exhibi-
tor to award him licenses for all of the theatres in his chain.
Id.
41. Many trade screening laws require distributors to conduct open bidding. See
infra notes 65-68, 70 and 82 and accompanying text.
42. See generally Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 496 F. Supp. at 416-18. This practice
has also been referred to as "advance licensing," "advance bidding," "blind buying,"
and "blind selling." See supra note 1.
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their motion pictures.4" Under this method, a distributor will
send potential exhibitors, between six months and a year
before the scheduled release date of a motion picture, a bid so-
licitation announcing the availability of the picture for licens-
ing. This solicitation generally includes the name of the
uncompleted motion picture, the names of its leading cast and
other key personnel, a general plot summary, speculation as to
the rating of the picture, the approximate date of delivery and
suggested licensing terms.' Based on this information and
other promotional materials supplied by the distributor, inter-
ested exhibitors negotiate with or return completed bids to the
licensing distributor. Trade screening, on the other hand, en-
tails the organized private showing of a completed motion pic-
ture by its distributor to interested exhibitors prior to the
commencement of negotiations or the solicitation of bids.
The primary justification underlying the use of blind bidding
by distributors appears to be one of marketing and licensing
efficiency. Distributors favor this licensing method because it
allows them to secure exhibition licenses with exhibitors
months in advance of scheduled release dates and to release
motion pictures with little delay between production and exhi-
bition. As one commentator has noted:
The distributors view blind bidding as the most efficient and
least risky method of marketing their films, principally because
it assures them placement of their motion pictures in the best
first-run theaters immediately upon completion. Timing is im-
portant because national advertising campaigns and numerous
product tie-ins enable maximum exploitation of a film's profit
potential during the initial weeks of exhibition. These market-
ing practices require significant advance time and are most ef-
fective when synchronized with a film release date. Moreover,
seasonal timing is important. Most films are now released dur-
ing the Christmas, Easter, and summer seasons, when audi-
ence attendance is highest. Furthermore, since some films can
be best exploited during only one of these seasons, failure to
secure appropriate exhibition houses for the desired season
may result in the costly "shelving" of a film for a long period.45
Exhibitors, on the other hand, view blind bidding as an un-
43. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 496 F. Supp. at 417.
44. Note, supra note 8, at 1131-32; Statfeld, supra note 8, at 29.
45. Note, supra note 8, at 1132. See also Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 496 F. Supp.
at 417; Statfeld, supra note 8, at 35, 37, 38.
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fair and unnecessary trade practice.46 Exhibitors contend that
the information made available to them about unreleased mo-
tion pictures in bid solicitations and other promotional materi-
als from distributors provides them with an inadequate and
misleading basis from which to exercise accurately their own
business judgment as to the quality and commercial potential
of motion pictures prior to licensing.47 Moreover, since a pic-
ture is often in production when blind bidding is undertaken,
the possibility exists that unforeseeable events or creative
changes could occur during the course of production, substan-
tially altering its post-licensing contents.48 Exhibitors also as-
sert that blind bidding forces them to take chances on the
suitability of pictures for their particular theatre audiences,
thereby risking their commercial reputations and community
standing.49 The risk of licensing undesirable pictures or "tur-
keys," exhibitors contend, has caused significant financial
losses for some exhibitors, forced some small exhibitors out of
business, as well as contributed to a rise in ticket prices. Con-
sequently, most exhibitors prefer the trade screening of mo-
tion pictures because it allegedly provides them with the
opportunity to readily assess the commercial potential and au-
dience suitability of pictures prior to licensing, thereby en-
abling them to make licensing decisions based on their own
judgment and not that of a picture's distributor.5 0
Although licensing a product sight unseen may seem to be a
46. See generally National Association of Theater Owners' Blind Bidding Position
Paper (1981) [hereinafter cited as NATO Position Paper]; Allied Artists Pictures Corp.,
496 F. Supp. at 421, 429-30; Statfeld, supra note 8, at 38-42.
47. One exhibitor has noted the following:
The most unfair element in the licensing of motion pictures through the bid-
ding process is the practice of blind bidding, whereby distributors request bids
from exhibitors before the picture is available to be screened, which precludes
the exhibitor from evaluating its grossing potential. This is analogous to an
individual purchasing a home or car by bidding against other persons, none of
whom is permitted to see the item before making an offer.
Durwood & Resnick, supra note 14, at 330-31.
48. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 496 F. Supp. at 430.
49. Id. Exhibitors offer the following as an example:
Exhibitors bid on a movie with Paul Newman which was supposed to have the
success of "Butch Cassidy" and was an action hockey picture-when this
movie "Slap Shot" reached the exhibitor's theater, it had some of the foulest
language ever heard on the screen and the owner was obligated to play it and
could only try to answer his patrons' violent complaints by trying to explain to
them about "Blind Bidding."
NATO Position Paper, supra note 46, at 2. See also Statfeld, supra note 8, at 36.
50. See Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 496 F. Supp. at 421; but see infra note 115.
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peculiar manner in which to conduct business, blind bidding,
as one commentator suggests, may not be as unfair to exhibi-
tors as it appears.
First, because the distributor is often in an equally blind posi-
tion when he agrees to underwrite or distribute an unproduced
film, it does not seem unreasonable for him to demand that the
exhibitor share some of the risk. Moreover, purchasing on the
basis of incomplete information certainly is not unique to the
motion picture industry. It also exists when a publisher under-
writes the work of an author based only on an idea, when a
television advertiser books time for a new series, and when one
invests in a Broadway play. While greater amounts of product
information may be disclosed in these analogous situations,
there is still significant risk involved. Second, while it is under-
standable that exhibitors wish to be in the position to "make
their own mistakes," it is possible that they will, for the most
part, make the same mistakes whether under a blind bidding
or trade screening system. Exhibitors seem to be most influ-
enced in their bidding decisions by the stars and subject mat-
ter of a film, for these factors often dictate a motion picture's
box office success. Since such information is disclosed to an
exhibitor before he bids for a film, trade screening should not
motivate markedly different bidding decisions. In addition, the
major distributors have proved to be astute judges of the tastes
of the American moviegoing public. They do not invest in films
which lack commercial appeal, and it is not at all certain that
individual exhibitors can better assess the public's tastes.
Third, although trade screening might occasionally enable ex-
hibitors to avoid booking a mediocre or offensive fim, it proba-
bly would not increase exhibitor profits. While trade screening
would reduce the fluctuations in bids to bring them more in
accord with actual fim value, exceptional films would com-
mand higher terms. Thus, the average return to exhibitors
could remain unchanged. In short, the "blindness" inherent in
advance bidding may appear unfair to exhibitors, but the effi-
ciencies which the practice permits probably benefit the indus-
try as a whole.
5 1
In addition, distributors assert that the prohibition of blind and
closed bidding has a negative effect on motion picture market-
ing, licensing, and production.52
51. Note, supra note 8, at 1134-35. See also discussion cited supra note 8.





Blind bidding has been a concern not only to exhibitors but
also to the Department of Justice, which has made several at-
tempts to curtail the practice. In 1940, a consent decree that
required trade screenings for all new releases was entered into
between the Department of Justice and five major distribu-
tors. 3 This decree expired in 1942. 54 Six years later, blind bid-
ding was addressed by the United States Supreme Court when
it approved the breakup of the distributors' anticompetitive
control of the motion picture industry in United States v. Para-
mount Pictures, Inc. , a civil antitrust action against the eight
major distributors. Although it found several marketing prac-
tices of the distributors to be in violation of federal antitrust
laws, the Court did not completely prohibit the practice of
blind bidding (or "blind-selling" as it was then called) since
the trial court had recommended that only a limited right of
rejection of blind bid motion pictures was necessary at the
time.56 This was largely due to the fact that distributors had
voluntarily continued to trade screen their pictures following
the expiration of the 1940 decree. However, the use of blind
bidding increased in the following decades and in 1968 a stipu-
lation limiting the number of motion pictures that could be
blind bid to three per year was entered into with the major dis-
53. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 1940-1943 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 56,072
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 1940). The decree provided in relevant part:
No consenting defendant engaged in the distribution of motion pictures . . .
shall license or offer for license a feature motion picture. . . for public exhibi-
tion within the United States of America at which an admission fee is to be
charged, until the feature has been trade shown within the exchange district
in which the public exhibition is to be held. Every trade showing shall be pre-
ceded by a notice, published in a trade publication having general circulation
among exhibitors in such exchange district, which shall state the title of the
picture and the date and the time when and the place or places where it will be
trade shown.
Id. at 289 (footnotes omitted). For a discussion regarding the early use of consent de-
crees as a means of regulating the motion picture industry, see Comment, Operation of
the Consent Decree in the Motion Picture Industry, 51 YALE L.J. 1175 (1942); Comment,
Legislation by Consent in the Motion Picture Industry, 50 YALE L.J. 854 (1941).
54. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 323, 331-33 (S.D.N.Y.
1946).
55. 334 U.S. 131 (1948). See supra note 13.
56. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 157-58 n.11 (1948). The
Paramount decision did approve the district court's decision to grant exhibitors the
right to reject 20% of motion pictures licensed in a group ("block booking") that had
not been trade screened prior to the granting of exhibition licenses. Id.
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tributors5 This agreement was allegedly allowed to expire in
1975 due to the desire of the Department of Justice to deregu-
late the motion picture industry.58 Thereafter, the use of blind
bidding increased rapidly, and by 1977, some distributors were
blind bidding from sixty to ninety percent of their new re-
leases.5 9 Having failed to eliminate the practice of blind bid-
ding with the assistance of the Department of Justice,
exhibitors turned to legislative channels in the late seventies
for relief.
Since 1978, exhibitors have been able to convince the
lawmakers of twenty-three states to enact trade screening laws
that restrict the use of blind and closed bidding and other li-
censing practices." These laws purport to provide exhibitors
with the opportunity to make informed licensing judgments re-
garding the commercial potential and audience suitability of
motion pictures when negotiating or bidding and to insert ele-
ments of fairness and orderliness into the motion picture li-
censing process. The legislative purpose enunciated in the
57. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc. No. 87-273 (S.D.N.Y., filed Aug. 14,
1968; renewed Jan. 1, 1971). This three picture limitation did not apply to any blind bid
motion picture with an exhibition license that provided the exhibitor with the right to
cancel the license upon viewing the completed picture. Id. at 4-5. Thus, a distributor
was permitted to blind bid an unlimited number of motion pictures under this stipula-
tion provided cancellation provisions were included in their licenses. See infra notes
150-58 and accompanying text.
58. Note, supra note 8, at 1137 n.36.
59. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 496 F. Supp. at 417.
60. States that have enacted trade screening laws as of January 1, 1984 are Ala-
bama (ALA. CODE §§ 8-18-1 to -18-6 (Supp. 1982)), Arkansas (ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 70-1101
to -1106 (Supp. 1983)), Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. §§ 106-1301 to -1305 (Supp. 1982)), Idaho
(IDAHO CODE §§ 18-7701 to -7708 (Supp. 1980)), Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. §§ 24-1-5-1 to -7
(West 1980)), Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 51-201 to -203 (Supp. 1982)), Kentucky (Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 365.750 - .990 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1982)), Louisiana (LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 37:2901 - :2905 (West Supp. 1982)), Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1901 -
1905 (1980, Supp. 1982)), Massachusetts (MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 93F, §§ 1 - 4 (West
Supp. 1982)), Missouri (Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 407.350 to -.357 (Vernon Supp. 1983)), Mon-
tana (MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-14-301 to -308 (1981)), New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 57-
5A-1 to -5 (Supp. 1982)), North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75C-1 to -5 (1981)), Ohio
(OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1333.05 to -.07 (Page 1979)), Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. § 646.890
(1979)), Pennsylvania (PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 203-1 to -11 (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984)),
South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 39-5-510 to -560 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982)), Tennes-
see (TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-25-701 to -704 (1983)), Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-13-1 to -
13-7 (1981)), Virginia (VA. CODE §§ 59.1-255 to -261 (Supp. 1982)), Washington (WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.58.010 to -.58.905 (Supp. 1983-1984)), and West Virginia (W. VA.
CODE §§ 47-11D-1 to -11D-4 (1980)). In addition to these state laws, trade screening
laws have been enacted in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 10,
§§ 2101 - 2105 (Supp. 1982)) and Prince George's County, Maryland (PRINCE GEORGE'S
COUNTY, MD. ORDINANCE C.B.- 125-1981 (Nov. 3,1981)).
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Washington Motion Picture Fair Competitive Act"' is indica-
tive of the general objective underlying trade screening
legislation:
The purpose of this chapter is to establish fair and open proce-
dures for bidding and negotiation for the right to exhibit mo-
tion pictures in the state in order to prevent unfair and
deceptive acts or practices and unreasonable restraints of
trade in the business of motion picture distribution and exhibi-
tion within the state; to promote fair and effective competition
in that business; and to insure that exhibitors have the oppor-
tunity to view a motion picture and know its contents before
committing themselves to exhibiting the motion picture in
their communities.
62
In effect, these laws may promote competition among distribu-
tors,6 3 reduce the risks and uncertainties that exhibitors previ-
ously had to assume under blind bidding, and advance the
financial and bargaining positions of exhibitors.64
A. Analysis of Trade Screening Laws
The twenty-three state trade screening laws are similar in
two respects. First, they generally prohibit the use of blind
61. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.58.010 to -.58.905 (Supp. 1983-1984).
62. Id. § 19.58.010.
63. Prohibiting blind bidding may increase competition among distributors be-
cause, by requiring that all motion pictures be shown prior to licensing, competition
among distributors will be on the basis of quality and content and not market strength
or reputation. But cf. Note, supra note 8, at 1134-35 (blind bidding is not the primary
reason independent distributors are at a competitive disadvantage).
64. According to the Allied Artists district court:
By far the most important purpose for which the [Ohio trade screening law]
appears to have been designed and its primary impact on the motion picture
industry in Ohio is to effect a better balance of bargaining power between ex-
hibitors and producer-distributors by the prohibition of risk-shifting devices
(e.g., blind bidding, guarantees), by disclosure of licensing procedures, and by
facilitating the exercise of exhibitors' informed business judgment.
Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 496 F. Supp. at 429. There is some question whether a
state has a legitimate interest in correcting bargaining imbalances between business
groups. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in the Allied Artists case, although recog-
nizing that a state has a legitimate interest in preventing unfair and deceptive trade
practices, found redressing an imbalance of bargaining power in favor of in-state ex-
hibitors to be a "highly suspect" objective under the commerce clause. 679 F.2d 656,
661 (1982). The Sixth Circuit stated: "[A] state's interest in righting a bargaining im-
balance, standing alone, is not sufficient under the commerce clause to permit direct
interference with pricing [e.g. advance and guarantee payments] where it burdens in-
terstate commerce." Id. at 665 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the court remanded to
the district court for further consideration the question of whether any legitimate state
interests exist to support provisions that restrict the use of advance and guarantee
payments in exhibition licenses. Id.
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bidding by requiring distributors to trade screen their motion
pictures before the licensing process can begin. Second, the
majority of the laws require distributors to follow certain bid-
ding and notice guidelines once a motion picture has been
trade screened and bids have been solicited. 5 Although there
is little uniformity among trade screening laws beyond these
similarities, they can be categorized into three general groups:
general prohibitory laws, laws containing exemptions and
waivers, and restrictive laws.
1. General Prohibitory Laws
Thirteen states have enacted trade screening laws that may
be termed general prohibitory laws.6 These laws mandate a
general prohibition of blind bidding by requiring mandatory
trade screenings of motion pictures before either licensing ne-
gotiations or bidding can commence. These laws also require
distributors to provide exhibitors with reasonable and uniform
notice of all trade screenings and to adhere to "open bidding"
procedures once bids have been solicited. 7 Open bidding in-
structions typically require distributors to include in their invi-
65. The fact that the basic framework for most of these laws was provided by a
model trade screening law distributed by the National Association of Theater Owners
accounts for these similarities.
It should be noted that trade screening laws do not require distributors to competi-
tively bid their motion pictures. Rather, once a picture has been trade screened ac-
cording to the provisions of the applicable trade screening law, its distributor is
permitted to license it either by negotiation or bidding. However, once a distributor
elects to bid a picture, he may be required to license it only by the bidding method. See
infra notes 99-108 and accompanying text.
66. The thirteen states are Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Louisi-
ana, Maine, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Oregon, Tennessee, Virginia, and Wash-
ington. See supra note 60. The Georgia trade screening law is the only one of these
laws to have been subjected to judicial review. See Paramount Pictures v. Busbee, 250
Ga. 252, 297 S.E. 2d 250 (1982) (affirming lower court's grant of summary judgment up-
holding the Georgia law).
67. The Georgia, Oregon, and Tennessee laws are exceptions providing neither no-
tice nor bidding guidelines. An example of a general prohibitory law is the Massachu-
setts trade screening law (MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 93F, §§ 1-4 (West Supp. 1982)),
which provides:
§ 1. Definitions
The following words, as used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise
requires or a different meaning is specifically prescribed, shall have the follow-
ing meaning:-
"Bid", a written offer or proposal by an exhibitor to a distributor, in response
to an "invitation to bid", stating the terms under which the exhibitor will agree
to exhibit a motion picture.
"Blind bidding", the solicitation of bidding for, solicitation of negotiation for,
or solicitations of offers for or agreeing to terms for the licensing or exhibition
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tations to bid information regarding the run of the motion
picture, names of all solicited exhibitors, the expiration date of
of, a motion picture if the motion picture has not been trade screened within
the commonwealth before any such event has occurred.
"Defined geographic area", a relevant market area as used in the motion pic-
ture industry.
"Distributor", any person engaged in the business of distributing or supply-
ing motion pictures to exhibitors by rental, sale or licensing.
"Exhibit" or "exhibition", showing a motion picture to the public for a
charge.
"Exhibitor", any person engaged in the business of operating one or more
theatres.
"Invitation to bid", a written solicitation or invitation by a distributor to one
or more exhibitors to bid for the right to exhibit a motion picture.
"License agreement", any contract agreement, understanding or condition
between a distributor and an exhibitor relating to the licensing of exhibition of
a motion picture by the exhibitor.
"Person", one or more individuals, partnerships, associates, societies, trusts,
or corporations.
"Run", the continuous exhibition of a motion picture in a defined geographic
area for a specified period of time. A "first run" is the first exhibition of a
picture in the designated area, a "second run" is the second exhibition and
"subsequent runs" are subsequent exhibitions after the second run. "Exclu-
sive run" is any run limited to a single theatre in a defined geographic area and
a "non-exclusive run" is any run in more than one theatre in a defined geo-
graphic area.
"Theatre", any establishment in which motion pictures are exhibited to the
public regularly for a charge.
"Trade screening", the showing of a motion picture by a distributor at some
location within Metropolitan Boston which is open to any exhibitor interested
in exhibiting the motion picture.
§ 2. Blind bidding: trade screening
Blind bidding is hereby prohibited within the commonwealth. No bids shall
be returnable, no negotiations for the exhibition or licensing of a motion pic-
ture shall take place, and no license agreement or any of its terms shall be
agreed to, for the exhibition of any motion picture before the motion picture
has been trade screened within the commonwealth.
A distributor shall include in each invitation to bid for a motion picture for
exhibition, if such motion picture has not already been trade screened within
the commonwealth, the date, time and place of the trade screening of the mo-
tion picture within the commonwealth.
A distributor shall provide reasonable and uniform notice to exhibitors
within the commonwealth of all trade screenings within the commonwealth of
motion pictures he is distributing.
Any purported waiver of the requirements of this section shall be void and
unenforceable.
§ 3. Bids; procedures
If bids are solicited from exhibitors for the licensing of a motion picture
within the commonwealth then:-
1. The invitation to bid shall specify (a) the number and length of runs for
which the bid is being solicited, whether it is a first, second or subsequent run,
and the geographic area for each run; (b) the names of all exhibitors who are
being solicited; (c) the date and hour the invitation to bid expires; and (d) the
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the bid, and when and where bids will be opened. These in-
structions further mandate that all bids be opened at the same
time in the presence of all interested exhibitors, that exhibi-
tors be provided with the opportunity to inspect all opened
bids, and that all bidding exhibitors be notified of the terms of
the winning bid and the name of the winning exhibitor. Open
bidding purports to promote fairness and disclosure in the bid-
ding process while eliminating the abuses that allegedly result
under closed bidding.68 In addition, some bidding instructions
may require a distributor to rebid a motion picture if the initial
round of bidding does not produce an acceptable offer.69
2. Laws Containing Waivers and Exemptions
Four states have trade screening laws with provisions that
allow distributors, under certain circumstances, to license mo-
tion pictures without a prior trade screening for exhibitors.7"
The Missouri trade screening law7' stands alone among these
laws in terms of uniqueness and complexity. This law provides
distributors with two exceptions to its general trade screening
requirement. First, distributors are allowed to blind bid pic-
tures based on books that have been on the best seller list for a
year or more or that have sold at least five hundred thousand
copies, pictures based on stage productions that have run at
location, including the address, where the bids will be opened, which shall be
within the commonwealth.
2. All bids shall be submitted in writing and shall be opened at the same
time and in the presence of exhibitors, or their agents, who submitted bids and
are present at such time.
3. After being opened, bids shall be subject to examination by exhibitors,
or their agents, who submitted bids. Within seven business days after a bid is
accepted, the distributor shall notify in writing each exhibitor who submitted
a bid of the terms of the accepted bid and the name of the winning bidder.
4. Once bids are solicited, the distributor shall license the picture only by
bidding and may negotiate if he does not accept any of the original bids.
§ 4. Violations
Any violations of the provisions of this act shall be deemed to be an unfair
and deceptive trade practice, as defined in section two of chapter ninety-three
A.
68. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 679 F.2d at 663. See supra notes 39-40 and accom-
panying text.
69. See infra notes 99-108 and accompanying text. For an example of a typical
open bidding procedure, see WASH REV. CODE ANN. § 19.58.040 (Supp. 1983).
70. The four states are Missouri, New Mexico, South Carolina, and West Virginia.
When trade screening is required by these laws, notice and bidding guidelines similar
to those contained in the general prohibitory laws must be followed by distributors.
71. Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 407.350 to -.357 (Vernon Supp. 1983).
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least six months, or pictures based on television and radio pro-
ductions.72 These exceptions are based on the premise that
sufficient prelicensing information is available to exhibitors
when motion pictures are derived from such sources that trade
screenings are not needed to ensure informed licensing deci-
sions.73 Second, the Missouri law allows distributors to blind
bid an aggregate of two pictures each year based on original
material.74 In addition, the Missouri law requires distributors
who blind bid motion pictures under these exceptions to pro-
vide exhibitors with information regarding the audience to
which the picture is directed, the anticipated rating of the pic-
ture, and a right of cancellation.75
The New Mexico, South Carolina, and West Virginia trade
screening laws also provide distributors with a limited oppor-
tunity to forego trade screening and to blind bid their motion
pictures. Under the New Mexico law,76 if, after fifteen days fol-
lowing the solicitation of bids, a distributor has not been noti-
fied by any of the solicited exhibitors of an intent to attend the
scheduled trade screening, a trade screening is not required.77
This provision avoids forcing a distributor into trade screening
a picture to an empty screening room simply to satisfy a trade
screening requirement. The South Carolina law78 provides
first-run exhibitors within any county the right to waive the
trade screening requirement for any motion picture if all the
exhibitors within that county agree in writing to such a
72. Id. § 407.357.
73. However, according to Robert Evans, producer of such motion pictures as Chi-
natown, Marathon Man, and Urban Cowboy:
Best sellers don't make the best movies. I've taken the New York Times best-
seller list for the last ten years and found many novels that were made into
unsuccessful movies and many that were purchased but never made into mov-
ies at all. There are two reasons for this. First, a best-selling novel may simply
not have a cinematic story; that's subjective. Second, the book-reading audi-
ence is not the movie-going audience; that's objective. The book-reading audi-
ence consists mostly of adults over 35, while the majority of the frequent
movie-going audience ranges in age from 12 to 30 and does not buy books av-
idly. Although a successful book doesn't guarantee a big film, it does guaran-
tee a big purchase price for movie rights. This makes agents very happy but
often leaves studios heavily inventoried in fashionable but unmakable
material.
R. Evans, The Producer, in THE MOVIE BUSINESS BOOK 14-15 (J. Squire ed. 1983).
74. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 407.353 (Vernon Supp. 1983).
75. Id. See infra notes 150-58 and accompanying text.
76. N.M. STAT. ANN. § § 57-5A-1 to -5A-5 (Supp. 1982).
77. Id. at § 57-5A-4D.
78. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 39-5-510 to -560 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982).
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waiver.79 In West Virginia, the trade screening law is waived
completely with respect to exhibitors whose theatres are lo-
cated within twenty miles of a bordering state that does not
have a trade screening law.80 This provision is designed to pro-
vide a limited number of West Virginia exhibitors with an op-
portunity to compete on an equal footing with out-of-state
exhibitors who are situated within the same exhibition market
but who can enter into exhibition licenses without a prior trade
screening. If West Virginia exhibitors were prevented from ne-
gotiating or bidding for pictures until they had been trade
screened, while out-of-state exhibitors, competing within the
same geographical market, were allowed to negotiate or bid for
those pictures without waiting for a prior trade screening, the
out-of-state exhibitors would have the opportunity to license
the more popular first-run motion pictures offered to that mar-
ket before West Virginia exhibitors could offer as much as a
dime. Thus, the West Virginia legislature provided the market
waiver to avoid placing a limited number of West Virginia ex-
hibitors at a competitive disadvantage within their respective
exhibition markets. In addition, the theatre-related patroniza-
tion of local businesses such as restaurants, and tax revenues,
that might otherwise have been lost out-of-state, are preserved.
Application of this waiver is, however, limited since Maryland
is the only state bordering West Virginia without a trade
screening law."' The West Virginia law is the only trade
screening law that presently contains this type of waiver.
3. Restrictive Laws
Seven states have enacted trade screening laws that, in addi-
tion to prohibiting blind bidding, restrict the inclusion of ad-
vance and guarantee payments in exhibition licenses.82 Five of
79. Id. § 39-5-540.
80. W. VA. CODE § 47-1D-3(d) (1980).
81. Prince George's County, Maryland does, however, have a trade screening ordi-
nance. See supra note 60.
82. The seven states with restrictive laws are Idaho, Kentucky, Missouri, Montana,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Utah. See supra note 60. The Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Utah
laws are presently being challenged by distributors in the courts. See infra note 109
and accompanying text. Of these seven laws, the Kentucky, Missouri, Ohio, and Penn-
sylvania laws include notice and bidding guidelines similar to those contained in the
general prohibitory laws. In addition, the Missouri law provides for a waiver of its
trade screening requirement, and the Pennsylvania law limits the length of exclusive




these seven restrict, either partially or completely, the use of
advance payments.83 In Pennsylvania and Idaho, the inclusion
of an advance payment in exhibition licenses is completely
prohibited,84 whereas in Missouri, Ohio, and Kentucky, ad-
vance payments are permissible, but the time of payment to
distributors is restricted." The advance payment provision of
the Ohio trade screening law provides:
No distributor shall condition the granting or execution of a li-
cense agreement on the exhibitor's advancing, more than four-
teen days prior to his first exhibition of a motion picture, any
money that is to be used as security for the exhibitor's per-
formance of the license agreement or is to be applied to any
payments that the exhibitor is required by the agreement to
make to the distributor.
86
Since distributors generally do not require advances to be
made more than two weeks prior to the scheduled release of a
motion picture, the time restrictions of the Ohio and Kentucky
laws impose little, if any, change in the customary payment of
advances.87 The alleged purposes of prohibiting the inclusion
of advance payments is first, to promote competition among
exhibitors within a particular geographical market by placing
new and smaller exhibitors on an equal footing with the larger,
more affluent exhibitors in that area; and second, to "protect"
No license agreement shall be entered into between distributor and exhibitor
to grant an exclusive first run or an exclusive multiple first run for more than
42 days without provision to expand the run to second run or subsequent run
theatres within the geographical area and licenses agreements and prints of
said motion picture shall be made available by the distributor to those subse-
quent run theatres that would normally be served on subsequent run
availability.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 203-7 (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984). This provision purports to pro-
mote a wider and more expeditious dissemination of motion pictures. See id. §§ 203-
2(4), -2(5), and -2(9). This provision, which is the only one of its kind, has been criti-
cized as being invalid under the commerce clause, the first amendment, and the
supremacy clause and is presently being challenged in a Pennsylvania federal district
court. Note, supra note 19, at 310-11. See infra notes 109 and 134.
83. In jurisdictions without such restrictions, distributors are allowed to receive
advance payments at any time. For a discussion regarding the use and role of advance
payments in exhibition licenses, see supra note 35 and accompanying text.
84. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 203-6 (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984); IDAHO CODE § 18-7706
(Supp. 1980).
85. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1333.06(C) (Page 1979); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 365.755(3) (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1982). The Missouri trade screening law prohibits
distributors from receiving any money from exhibitors more than fourteen days prior
to the scheduled release date. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 407.357 (Vernon Supp. 1983).
86. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1333.06(C) (Page 1979).
87. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 496 F. Supp. at 420.
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exhibitors from lending interest-free capital to distributors.88
Six of the restrictive laws expressly limit the use of guaran-
tee payments in exhibition licenses. There are two types of
guarantee payment restrictions: coupling and discretionary.
Four of these laws contain a coupling restriction that prohibits
the inclusion of guarantee payments in exhibition licenses in
which the exhibitor is required to make a payment to the dis-
tributor based on attendance or box office receipts or, in other
words, on a percentage rental basis.89 For example, the coup-
ling restriction of the Montana trade screening law provides:
It is unlawful for any license agreement that provides for a fee
or other payment to the distributor based in whole or in part on
the attendance or the box office receipts at a theatre within the
state to contain or be conditioned upon a guarantee of a mini-
mum payment to the distributor.9 °
Since the coupling of a percentage rental arrangement and a
guarantee is prohibited in these states, any distributor seeking
a guarantee payment from exhibitors is allowed to license
those motion pictures only on a flat fee basis.9' Distributors
contend that coupling restrictions are, in effect, a complete pro-
hibition on the use of guarantee payments because they allege
that they cannot economically afford to license first-run motion
pictures on a flat fee basis, as opposed to a percentage basis.92
The primary purpose of restricting the unfettered use of guar-
antee payments is allegedly to promote competition among ex-
hibitors by providing new and small exhibitors with the
opportunity to compete on an equal footing with the large,
more affluent exhibitors within their exhibition market.93
88. Brief of Defendant-Appellant Fox Theatres Management Corp. at 26, Associ-
ated Film Distribution Corp. v. Thornburgh, 683 F.2d 808 (3d Cir. 1982).
89. IDAHO CODE § 18-7704 (Supp. 1980); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-305(1) (1981); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 203-5 (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-13-4 (Supp.
1981).
90. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-305(1) (1981).
91. Under a flat fee arrangement, an exhibitor licenses a motion picture at a flat
rate that remains constant throughout the picture's run, regardless of box office re-
ceipts or attendance. See supra note 27.
92. Brief of Appellant at 9, Warner Bros., Inc. v. Wilkinson, 533 F. Supp. 105 (D.
Utah 1981). See Warner Bros., Inc. v. Wilkinson, 533 F. Supp. 105 (D. Utah 1981), appeal
pending, No. 82-1093 (10th Cir. 1982) (distributor's challenge of the coupling restriction
contained in the Utah trade screening law).
93. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 496 F. Supp. at 451; Brief of Appellant, supra note
88, at 25. As one commentator has noted:
Many small exhibitors do not have the financial resources to pay large guaran-
tees months in advance for a film that is being touted as a potential box office
smash. The small exhibitor is consequently in a dilemma when, months
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However, such restrictions, distributors contend, may in fact
tend to reduce, rather than promote, competition among exhib-
itors since, without the ability to accept these licensing terms,
distributors are more likely to award licenses on the basis of
such factors as a theatre's location, size, and box office per-
formance record, attributes usually displayed by the larger,
more established theatres of a particular market.94 Guarantee
payment restrictions also allegedly protect the economic inter-
ests of exhibitors by reducing the ability of distributors to
share the risk of loss from commercially unsuccessful pictures
with exhibitors. 95
The Ohio and Kentucky trade screening laws contain discre-
tionary guarantee payment restrictions.96 Under these provi-
sions, although distributors are prohibited from soliciting a
guarantee payment with a percentage rental term, it is within
the discretion of exhibitors to offer distributors this combina-
tion in their bids. For example, the guarantee restriction of the
Kentucky trade screening law provides:
No distributor shall condition the granting or execution of a
license agreement on a guarantee of a minimum payment to
the distributor, if the exhibitor is required by the license agree-
ment to make any payment to the distributor that is based on
the attendance or the box office receipts at a theatre at which
the motion picture is exhibited.97 (emphasis added)
However, as one commentator has noted, the discretionary re-
striction will not likely affect the ability of distributors to ob-
tain guarantee payments, particularly for exceptional motion
pictures, since affluent exhibitors will be compelled to "volun-
teer" guarantees as a means of effectively competing against
other exhibitors who may be bidding or negotiating for the
same motion picture.98
before its release, the distributor sends out bid request letters for such a film.
The small exhibitor may gamble on the picture and risk financial disaster if he
loses, or not bid and watch as larger exhibitors share in the profits for a film he
could not afford so far in advance.
Statfeld, supra note 8, at 38.
94. Brief of Appellant, supra note 92, at 12-13.
95. Brief of Appellant, supra note 88, at 25-26.
96. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1333.06(B)(Page 1979); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 365.755(2)
(Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1982).
97. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 365.755(2) (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1982).




Another common restriction contained within trade screen-
ing laws is a rebidding provision. Occasionally a distributor
will competitively bid a motion picture and be dissatisfied with
the bids returned by solicited exhibitors. The bidding guide-
lines of fifteen trade screening laws specifically include rebid-
ding provisions that instruct distributors as to what licensing
options are available to them when an acceptable bid is not re-
ceived from the initial round of bidding.99 There are three
types of rebidding provisions: mandatory, optional, and an in-
termediate provision.
Under a mandatory rebidding provision, once a distributor
elects to license a particular motion picture under the competi-
tive bidding method, he is thereafter prohibited from licensing
that picture under any other method.100 For example, the
mandatory rebidding provision of the South Carolina trade
screening law provides: "Once bids are solicited, the distribu-
tor shall license the picture only by bidding and must solicit
rebids if he does not accept any of the submitted bids."'' The
apparent purpose of mandatory rebidding is to prevent "produ-
cers from deceptively putting films out on competitive bid in
order simply to test the market without any real intention of
licensing the film to the best bidders."'0 2 Exhibitors assert that
mandatory rebidding is necessary "to prevent a distributor
from using the bidding process to survey the market and then
award the picture to a favored exhibitor anyway. Under the
old system, if the distributor did not like the winner, he called
off the game."'0 3
Under an optional rebidding provision, a distributor is given
the option either to rebid his picture or to enter into negotia-
99. Rebidding provisions are only applicable when a distributor elects to license a
motion picture under the competitive bidding method rather than by negotiation. See
supra note 65.
100. The states with trade screening laws that contain mandatory rebidding provi-
sions are Alabama (ALA. CODE § 8-18-5(b) (Supp. 1982)), Kentucky (KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 365,760(6) (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1982)), Louisiana (LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 37:2904(4) (West Supp. 1983)), Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1333.07(F) (Page 1979)),
Pennsylvania (PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 203-8(e) (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984)), South Caro-
lina (S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-530(d) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982)), Virginia (VA. CODE
§ 59.1-259.4 (1982)), Washington (WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.58.040(4) (Supp. 1983-
1984)), and West Virginia (W. VA. CODE § 47-11D-4(4) (1980)).
101. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-530(d) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982).
102. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 679 F.2d at 663.
103. Brief of Appellant, supra note 88, at 27.
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tions with selected exhibitors if the initial round of bidding
does not produce a satisfactory bid. 10 4 For example, the op-
tional rebidding provision of the New Mexico trade screening
law provides: "[0] nce bids are solicited, the distributor shall
have the option to license the motion picture by competitive
negotiation if he does not accept any of the submitted bids."10 5
In jurisdictions without rebidding provisions, distributors are
similarly free to license their pictures by negotiation when an
acceptable bid is not received from exhibitors. This alternative
to mandatory rebidding apparently has been adopted by those
legislatures that find nothing inherently unfair about allowing
sellers to occasionally use the competitive bidding process as a
means of determining buyer interest in their product.
In contrast to mandatory and optional rebidding, two trade
screening laws contain rebidding provisions that set forth an
intermediate rebidding requirement.0 6 Under the intermedi-
ate provision, if a distributor does not receive an acceptable
bid from the initial round of bidding, the distributor is required
to rebid the motion picture. If the second round does not pro-
duce an acceptable bid, the distributor is then allowed to
forego competitive bidding and enter into negotiations with se-
lected exhibitors. 0 7 For example, the intermediate rebidding
provision set forth in the Missouri trade screening law
provides:
If a distributor issues invitations to bid for a motion picture
and he receives no bids for the motion picture, he may then
negotiate for the picture with all exhibitors on the bid list. No
further bidding is required. If a distributor receives bids which
are not acceptable to the distributor the first time the motion
picture is bid, he must rebid the motion picture a second time
and if after bidding the motion picture a second time the bids
are still unacceptable, he shall notify all exhibitors of such re-
jections and then may negotiate the motion picture. No further
bidding is required and all exhibitors must be given an oppor-
104. The states with trade screening laws that contain optional rebidding provisions
are Arkansas (ARK. STAT. ANN. § 70-1104(4) (Supp. 1983)), Massachusetts (MAss. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 93F, § 3.4 (West Supp. 1983-1984)), New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-
5A-5(D) (Supp. 1982)), and North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75C-4(d) (1981)).
105. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-5A-5(D) (Supp. 1983).
106. The states with trade screening laws that contain intermediate rebidding pro-
visions are Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. § 51-203(c) (Supp. 1983)) and Missouri (Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 407.355.3 (Vernon Supp. 1983)).
107. See infra text following note 170.
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tunity to negotiate.10 8
This provision discourages distributors from using the bidding
process as a "testing process" by requiring a mandatory sec-
ond round of bidding, yet it provides flexibility by allowing dis-
tributors the option to enter into negotiations when the
bidding process has genuinely failed to produce a satisfactory
result.
B. Response by Distributors
Considering it to be nothing more than "special-interest" leg-
islation designed to disrupt traditional licensing practices, dis-
tributors have not reacted passively to the enactment of trade
screening legislation. Led primarily by the direction and ef-
forts of their representative organization, the Motion Picture
Association of America (MPAA), distributors have responded
in several ways in an attempt to preserve the opportunity to
blind bid motion pictures when the practice is necessary. In
the courts, distributors have challenged the constitutionality of
the Georgia, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Utah trade screening
laws.0 9 Economically, several major distributors have indi-
108. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 407.355.3 (Vernon Supp. 1983).
109. See Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Busbee, 250 Ga. 252, 297 S.E.2d 250 (1982) (af-
firmed lower court's grant of summary judgment upholding the Georgia trade screen-
ing law); Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408 (S.D. Ohio 1980)
(Ohio trade screening law held constitutional), aftd in part, remanded in part, 679 F.2d
656 (6th Cir. 1982) (affirmed lower court's validation of trade screening and bidding
guidelines, remanded issue regarding the validity of the advance and guarantee pay-
ment restrictions under the commerce clause); Associated Film Distribution Corp. v.
Thornburgh, 520 F. Supp. 971 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (grant of summary judgment holding the
Pennsylvania trade screening law unconstitutional on its face), rev'd and remanded,
683 F.2d 808 (3d Cir. 1982) (reversed lower court's grant of summary judgment and
remanded case for trial); Warner Bros., Inc. v. Wilkinson, 533 F. Supp. 105 (D. Utah
1981) (grant of summary judgment upholding the guarantee payment restriction of the
Utah trade screening law), appeal pending, No. 82-1093 (10th Cir. 1982). In addition to
these cases, two distributors have an action pending in a Maryland federal district
court challenging the constitutionality of the Prince George's County trade screening
ordinance. Twentieth Century-Fox v. Prince George's County, No. H-81-3185 (D. Md.,
filed Dec. 11, 1981). Twentieth Century-Fox filed a motion for summary judgment on
June 18, 1982, however, a hearing on the motion has been postponed, at Fox's request,
while the MPAA attempts to have legislation introduced repealing the county's ordi-
nance. Letter from Steven M. Gilbert, Associate County Attorney, Prince George's
County, Md. to Thomas A. Bartasi (Jan. 20, 1983).
The plaintiff-distributors in these cases have challenged the validity of the trade
screening laws in question on various grounds including the first amendment, the com-
merce clause, the due process clause, the supremacy clause, and federal copyright and
antitrust laws. For a discussion regarding the constitutionality of trade screening leg-
islation, see Comment, State Regulation of Motion Picture Distributors, 3 PACE L. REV.
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cated that they may avoid filming their motion pictures in
states that have enacted or that plan to enact trade screening
laws."' Legislatively, distributors have continued to lobby ex-
tensively in states contemplating the enactment of trade
screening legislation and have supported several attempts to
repeal existing laws."'
Distributors contend that compliance with trade screening
laws disrupts motion picture distribution, licensing, and pro-
duction in several ways."2 First, distributors assert that com-
pliance with trade screening laws, in particular, trade
screening and open bidding requirements, delays the release
of some motion pictures." 3 In states without trade screening
laws, distributors can blind bid and license motion pictures
while they are still in production, thereby enabling pictures to
go from production to exhibition with little, if any, delay. The
prompt and timely release of motion pictures is essential to the
successful marketing of some motion pictures."14 According to
107 (1982); Note, supra note 19; Statfeld, supra note 8, at 44-56; Note, supra note 8, at
1137-47.
In addition, distributors have themselves challenged, along with the Department of
Justice, the use by certain exhibitors of a practice known as "product splitting." Prod-
uct splitting, the agreed-upon allocation of motion pictures among exhibitors within a
particular exhibition market, is allegedly used by exhibitors to reduce bidding compe-
tition among themselves. See, e.g., General Cinema Corp. v. Buena Vista Distribution
Co., 532 F. Supp. 1244 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (product splitting held per se illegal under Sher-
man Act); United States v. Capitol Service, Inc., NO. 80-C-407 (E.D. Wisc. June 16, 1983)
(split agreement among exhibitors in Milwaukee exhibition market held to be an un-
lawful form of price fixing and market allocation under Sherman Act); see generally H.
SWERDLOW & J. JAFFE, supra note 13, at 247-48, 250-54; Conant, supra note 13, at 103-07.
So while exhibitors attempt to curtail the use of blind bidding by distributors, distribu-
tors are similarly seeking to end the use of product splitting by some exhibitors.
110. Harris, Film Studios Threaten Retaliation Against States Banning Blind Bids,
Los Angeles Times, June 1, 1981, § IV, at 1, col. 1. Location filming is important to the
host state's economy because of the money it generates in the form of direct location
expenditures and state tax revenues. For example, location expenditures in California
for feature motion pictures in 1981 totaled $104 million. Schipper, Calif. losingfilm pro-
duction to other states' competition, The Hollywood Reporter, Apr. 13, 1983, at 1, col. 4.
111. See infra note 138.
112. For the various legal challenges made by distributors against trade screening
legislation, see cases and discussion cited supra note 109.
113. Memorandum from the Motion Picture Association of America in Opposition
to Texas Senate Bill 502 and House Bill 1103 (proposed Texas trade screening law) at 4
(1983).
114. See supra text accompanying note 45. The prompt release of motion pictures is
also necessary to avoid carrying charges, the daily financing costs that accumulate on
borrowed capital before a motion picture begins to generate revenue at the box office.
Regarding carrying charges, Peter S. Myers, senior vice-president of Twentieth Cen-
tury-Fox Entertainment, Inc. has stated:
If Fox was forced to delay a release six months in order to screen the picture
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distributors, trade screening laws make such release impossi-
ble or exceedingly difficult when the final print of a particular
motion picture is available close to the time of its scheduled
release date, since it must then be trade screened before li-
censing, let alone exhibition, is allowed to begin.1 ' In addition
to disrupting marketing and release schedules, distributors
contend that this delay will result in higher ticket prices in
some areas." 6 Second, distributors argue that the disclosure of
bidding information to exhibitors mandated by "open bidding"
procedures, 117 coupled with rebidding provisions, disrupts the
competitive framework of the bidding process by enabling ex-
hibitors to use this information to reduce the terms they might
otherwise be willing to offer distributors."' Third, distributors
for our customers [exhibitors), that would add at least $15-million annually to
interest costs, further delaying the return on our investments, and would give
television and other media the chance to copy our pictures.
Myers, supra note 11, at 282.
115. In addition, at least one exhibitor has expressed dissatisfaction with the re-
quirement that all motion pictures be trade screened prior to licensing. This small
community exhibitor claimed that compliance with the mandatory trade screening re-
quirement of the Ohio trade screening law disrupted his ability to effectively promote
and advertise upcoming pictures, made it exceedingly difficult for him to acquire prints
of newly released pictures from distributors, and reduced the gross income of his thea-
tres. Affidavit from John Tabor to the Business and Commerce Committee of the
House of Representatives, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Aug. 6, 1979 (affidavit sub-
mitted in opposition to the then pending Pennsylvania trade screening law).
116. Regarding an increase in ticket prices, distributors have noted the following:
If Star Trek or Superman opened everywhere but in a state with [a trade
screening law], the volume of business in those states would have a dramatic
effect on the bids that exhibitors would then have to submit. In addition, last
minute "panic" buying to fill screens that would otherwise be dark at key holi-
days might also drive up rental prices unnecessarily. These effects would be
contrary to the best interests of the local consumer.
Exhibitors by law set their own admission prices. Inevitably, some exhibi-
tors will bid so high for a Star Trek, a proven audience attraction, that it will
require the exhibitor to raise boxoffice [sic] prices to cover the bids. Thus,
movie-goers will have to pay higher boxoffice [sic] prices, especially for the
movies that people want to see most. While movie-goers in other states will
pay average prices to see the best movies, with the delayed bidding required
by this bill, the public in a state With this law will could [sic] pay self-imposed
higher prices for the big movies.
Furthermore, the costs of a print of a color feature film range from $2,000 to
$9,000. A proposal requiring mandatory screenings would add significant costs
to the distributors. Such an expenditure would force prices higher for the ex-
hibitor and the movie-going public. For some smaller, independent distribu-
tors, the costs of complying with such a statute may preclude them from trying
to market their pictures there altogether.
Memorandum, supra note 113, at 4-5.
117. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
118. Brief of Appellants at 8, 41-43, Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 679 F.2d
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predict that the increased risks, burdens, and costs that trade
screening laws impose on their licensing and marketing efforts
will render motion picture production an unattractive invest-
ment to potential financers, 119 which in turn will reduce the
number and diversity of motion pictures produced. 120 One dis-
tributor has noted the following:
In a society offering a variety of investment choices, this in-
creased risk may reasonably be expected to shift some invest-
ments out of films or to affect adversely the terms on which
funds may be lent. This would serve to limit the number of
films which some distributors can afford to produce, resulting
in an artificial limitation on the number of films available to the
public.
121
Of the four trade screening cases decided to date, only the
district court in Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes122 con-
ducted a full fact-finding proceeding examining the alleged ef-
fects of trade screening laws on motion picture licensing and
production.1 23 Regarding the potential delay occasioned by the
trade screening and bidding requirements of the Ohio trade
screening law, the district court considered the risk to be mini-
656 (6th Cir. 1982). Moreover, one distributor has suggested that open bidding creates
an uneasiness among exhibitors. Peter S. Myers, senior vice-president of Twentieth
Century-Fox Entertainment, Inc., has noted the following example:
One exhibitor bid a run in a zone, putting up a guarantee of $75,000 and asking
for clearance over a certain theatre; he put in a second bid with a $50,000 guar-
antee with clearance, and a third bid of $25,000 with another clearance. He was
present when the bids were opened, saw that the highest bid was $47,500, and
withdrew his $75,000 bid. Since bids are not binding until a contract is signed,
we are left at a competitive disadvantage. Because of this practice and exhibi-
tor apathy-many failed to show up at all-we abandoned open bidding.
Myers, supra note 11, at 282.
119. Sources for motion picture financing include individual and corporate inves-
tors, banks and other lending institutions, as well as the respective production-distri-
bution companies themselves. For a discussion of the investment and financial
aspects of motion picture production and distribution, see M. MAYER, supra note 20, at
17-26; Garey, Elements of Feature Financing, in THE MOVIE BUSINESS BOOK 95 (J.
Squire ed. 1983); Weiss & Benjamin, Feature Film Secured Financing: A Traditional
Approach for Lender's Counsel, 5 COMM/ENT L.J. 75 (1982); Mello, Investors: You
Oughta Be in Pictures, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 24, 1981, at 21, col. 4.
120. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 496 F. Supp. at 434-35.
121. Brief of Appellant, supra note 92, at 25-26.
122. 496 F. Supp. 408 (S.D. Ohio 1980), affd in part, remanded in part, 679 F.2d 656
(6th Cir. 1982).
123. The Allied Artists case involved eight weeks of discovery, followed by a four
week trial. Another proceeding is scheduled to begin in Pennsylvania, where the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals ordered a trial in the case challenging the Pennsylvania trade
screening law. See infra note 134.
No. 1] TRADE SCREENING LAWS
mal.124 The court recognized that the law threatened to delay
releases under certain circumstances, yet indicated that few
pictures would be affected, that it would be unlikely for any
delay to exceed four weeks,125 and that the ability of distribu-
tors to advertise, promote, or release pictures during peak ex-
hibition periods would not be substantially impaired. 126 The
court also was not convinced that the disclosure of bidding in-
formation to exhibitors would necessarily reduce exhibitor
competition for licensing terms. 127 Further, although the court
noted that the law had the potential to increase the costs of
motion picture distribution 28 and could operate to decrease
distributors' revenues, 129 it was not persuaded that such effects
were significant enough to discourage investment in motion
picture productions. 30
Due to the limited time the Ohio trade screening law had
been in effect prior to trial,'3' distributors question whether the
conclusions reached by the district court in Allied Artists were
based on an adequate factual foundation. 3 2 The district court
itself recognized that one reason there was so little evidence of
delays at the time of trial was that the distributors, in an at-
124. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 496 F. Supp. at 423.
125. Id. at 421-23, 438-39. Regarding the occurrence of delays, the district court
found: "Occasionally, a film is delayed in production and is actually completed within
a few days of its scheduled release date. When that occurs, the time required by the
bidding process may delay a film beyond the contemplated release date." Id. at 422.
126. Id. at 424.
127. Id. at 449.
128. Id. at 423, 439.
129. Id. at 423-24.
130. Id. at 424, 434-35. The district court noted that witnesses had:
made it clear that the decision to finance and produce a particular film is not
primarily motivated by considerations regarding its marketing, such as
whether it should be blind bid or trade screened. . . . And Alan Hirschfield,
referring to the period from 1973 to 1978, when he was president and chief ex-
ecutive officer of Columbia Pictures, testified that investors relied on Colum-
bia's production and marketing expertise and did not consider what licensing
and bidding procedures Columbia used.
Id. at 434. A reduction in motion picture production has not yet resulted. In fact, in
1982, 244 new feature motion pictures were released by the major companies, an in-
crease of 21% over 1981 and the largest number since 1972. Ritzer, supra note 14. One
analyst has even noted that the current increase in motion picture production has ac-
tually resulted in a production glut. Ritzer, Production glut threatens industry profits:
Londoner, The Hollywood Reporter, Apr. 22, 1983, at 1, col. 1; see also Sansweet & Lan-
dro, As the Money Rolls In, Movie Makers Discover It Is a Mixed Blessing, Wall St. J.,
Sept. 1, 1983, at 1, col. 6 (high investment interest in motion picture production).
131. The Ohio law had been in effect for approximately eight months at the time of
trial. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 496 F. Supp. at 422.
132. Brief of Appellants, supra note 118, at 6.
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tempt to lessen the initial impact of the law, "rushed" to blind
bid their pictures prior to its effective date. 133 Thus, it appears
that the facts upon which the district court relied for its conclu-
sions may not have given an accurate indication of the actual
long term effects of the law. More accurate factual findings are
likely to be made in the lawsuit challenging the Pennsylvania
trade screening law13 1 since that law will have been in effect for
over two years by the time of trial. Lawmakers, of course,
should not view the factual findings made by any court as be-
ing wholly applicable to licensing and distribution within their
respective states. Rather, they should make their own factual
findings as to the effects of blind bidding and trade screening
on licensing and distribution within their states before acting.
Presently, the enactment of trade screening legislation ap-
pears to have come to a halt. The last trade screening law to be
enacted was the Missouri law in July, 1982.11 Prior to the pas-
sage of that law, over a year had passed since a state trade
screening law had been enacted. 136 During the 1983 legislative
session, bills to enact trade practice restrictions were pending
in Arizona, Colorado, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, Texas, and Vermont; none of these bills were en-
acted.137 Concern of legislators as to whether such legislation
is both constitutionally and legislatively sound, as well as the
lobbying efforts of distributors and state film commissions,
may account for this decline in newly-enacted trade screening
laws. Several bills to repeal existing laws have also been
introduced.1
38
133. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 496 F. Supp. at 422.
134. Associated Film Distribution Corp. v. Thornburgh, 520 F. Supp. 971 (E.D. Pa.
1981), rev'd and remanded, 683 F.2d 808 (3d Cir. 1982). On a motion for summary judg-
ment, the district court held that the Pennsylvania law was unconstitutional on its face
under the first amendment and federal copyright law. Although the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals approved the legal analysis adopted by the district court, it reversed
the district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for trial due to
many unresolved questions of fact.
135. Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 407.350 to -.357 (Vernon Supp. 1983).
136. The state preceding Missouri was Kansas, which passed its trade screening
law in April, 1981. Prince George's County, Maryland, passed its trade screening ordi-
nance in November, 1981. See supra note 60.
137. Letter from Simon Barsky, Vice President and Deputy General Counsel of the
Motion Picture Association of America, to Thomas A. Bartasi (Aug. 31, 1983).
138. The Arkansas House of Representatives recently voted 73-6 to repeal its trade
screening law; however, the measure failed to reach the Senate for approval before
adjournment by the state legislature. Legislators must now wait until the legislature
reconvenes in 1985 before the repeal measure can be reintroduced. Ritzer, Attempt to





The goal of every lawmaker, when drafting legislation, is to
advance the particular statutory objectives with laws that are
necessary, drawn with precision, and in the public interest.
This drafting objective is particularly important with respect to
legislation, such as trade screening laws, that involves first
amendment and commerce clause considerations because the
constitutionality of such legislation is tested under legal stan-
dards that require not only the advancement of sufficient state
interests but also the selection of the least restrictive means
possible of advancing such interests. 139 In an effort to facilitate
such draftsmanship, the following section discusses less re-
Mar. 30, 1983, at 1, col. 2. Attempts to repeal the Georgia and Tennessee laws have also
been made; the Georgia bill has been referred to an interim study. Letter, supra note
137.
139. Motion pictures are a protected form of expression and any regulation affecting
their dissemination, such as trade screening laws, may be subject to review under the
first amendment. The courts that have examined the constitutionality of trade screen-
ing legislation under the first amendment have characterized it as content-neutral,
trade regulation, only incidentally affecting expression, and thus have applied the four-
pronged balancing test set forth by the United States Supreme Court in United States
v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, reh'g denied, 393 U.S. 900 (1968), as the applicable standard of
review. See Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 496 F. Supp. at 433; Associated Film Distribu-
tion Corp., 520 F. Supp. at 986 and 683 F.2d at 813 (on appeal); Paramount Pictures Inc.,
250 Ga. at -, 297 S.E.2d at 253-54. The O'Brien test provides:
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitu-
tional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial gov-
ernmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to _furtherance of the
interest.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377 (emphasis added).
Trade screening laws also involve commerce clause considerations since interstate
commerce includes the nationwide distribution of motion pictures. In analyzing the
burden of the Ohio trade screening law on interstate commerce, the Allied Artists dis-
trict court applied the two-step balancing test set forth by the United States Supreme
Court in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970), as the applicable standard of
review. See Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 496 F. Supp. at 440; see also Allied Artists
Pictures Corp., 679 F.2d at 665. The Pike test states:
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local pub-
lic interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will
be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive
in relation to the putative local benefits. Huron Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S.
440, 443. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one
of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course
depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be
promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.
Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 (emphasis added).
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strictive alternatives to the common provisions contained in
trade screening laws.140
Obviously, the least burdensome alternative to a trade
screening law is no law. The need for trade screening legisla-
tion, and the benefits and burdens resulting therefrom, have
been subject to much debate among distributors, exhibitors
and legislators,'4 1 and the fact that twenty-seven states have
yet to enact such legislation is evidence as to how unsettled
the issue is. The initial question lawmakers from blind bidding
states should resolve is whether it is in the public interest to
regulate the motion picture licensing process. 142 In answering
this question, legislators should determine whether the bene-
fits of an unrestricted licensing process outweigh the alleged
unfairness and harms resulting from blind and closed bidding.
In addition, legislators should keep in mind that the constitu-
tionality of three laws is still in question.'43 The following alter-
natives and suggestions should also be considered.
A. Mandatory Trade Screening Requirements
Exhibitors feel there is no substitute for viewing what they
are licensing prior to licensing. However, as previously noted,
the use of blind bidding may not be as unfair to exhibitors as it
may appear.1' Moreover, trade screening laws, in particular
mandatory trade screening requirements, may have undesir-
able consequences on motion picture licensing in terms of de-
laying the release of motion pictures and increasing
140. See generally Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 496 F. Supp. at 435 n.15, 440-41 (dis-
cussion of less restrictive alternatives to the Ohio trade screening law); Associated
Film Distribution Corp., 520 F. Supp. at 989-90 (discussion of less restrictive alterna-
tives to the Pennsylvania trade screening law).
141. See discussion cited supra note 8.
142. See Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 679 F.2d at 661 ("Statutes which require that
buyers and sellers provide each other with accurate information about their products
and services in order to counteract deceptive and misleading practices are based on
legitimate state interests."); but see Paramount Pictures Inc., 250 Ga. at -, 297 S.E.2d
at 254-55 ("I fail to see wherein the competitive struggles of motion picture distributors
and exhibitors are 'affected with a public interest' to any greater degree than similar
struggles of other producers and consumers." Id. at 255) (Weltner, J., dissenting). See
also discussion cited supra note 8.
143. Although the Georgia trade screening law and the trade screening and open
bidding provisions of the Ohio trade screening law have been upheld, challenges made
against the Pennsylvania trade screening law, the advance and guarantee restrictions
of the Ohio law, and the guarantee restriction of the Utah law are still unsettled. See
supra notes 109 and 134.
144. See supra text accompanying note 51.
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distribution costs.14 Since the box office success or failure of
any picture depends upon the unpredictable response of the
movie-going public, the questions posed concerning mandatory
trade screening are whether the commercial potential of a pic-
ture can be ascertained with any degree of accuracy on the ba-
sis of an advance screening, and whether the suitability of a
picture for an exhibitor's customers can only be determined
from such a screening. The following discussion of suggested
alternatives to a mandatory trade screening requirement will
be helpful to those lawmakers who feel some regulation of
blind bidding short of mandatory trade screening may be
necessary.
1. Waiver Provisions
One criticism made against mandatory trade screening is
that it prevents exhibitors from either negotiating or bidding
for a motion picture prior to its completion and screening, re-
gardless of how much information they may have about a pic-
ture or how willing they are to license it sight unseen. It may
not always be necessary for exhibitors to view motion pictures
in order to make informed licensing judgments as to commer-
cial potential and audience suitability. For instance, some mo-
tion pictures, particularly those based on popular or well
known subject matter, such as a Star Wars, Rocky, or James
Bond sequel, or those which are the product or creation of a
reputable talent, such as George Lucas or Steven Spielberg,
guarantee by their subject matter or talent alone a certain de-
gree of box office success. For example, George Lucas' Star
Wars sequel, Return of the Jedi, recently set an opening-day
and one-day box office record by grossing $6.2 million on its
first day of release.1 46 Requiring mandatory trade screenings
for these pictures may become more of a burdening formality
to anxious exhibitors than a beneficial licensing provision.
Possible alternatives to mandatory trade screening would be
to provide exhibitors with the opportunity to waive the trade
screening requirement, to allow blind bidding in certain lim-
ited situations when the risks associated with the method are
reduced to what may be perceived to be an "acceptable" level,
145. See supra notes 112-21 and accompanying text.
146. Caulfileld, A Record 1st-Day Gross of $6 Million for 'Jedi', Los Angeles Times,
May 27, 1983, § VI, at 1, col. 1. See also Pollock, 'Jedi' Pulls In $41 Million in First Six
Days, Los Angeles Times, June 1, 1983, § IV, at 1, col. 3.
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or to allow each distributor the opportunity to blind bid a spec-
ified number of motion pictures per year.147 Of the several
states that presently provide waiver provisions, the South Car-
olina law provides the broadest waiver provision by allowing
exhibitors within any particular county to waive the trade
screening requirement for any motion picture if all exhibitors
within that county agree to such a waiver. 148 An even broader
waiver would be to allow any willing exhibitor to waive the
trade screening requirement and to negotiate or bid for a pic-
ture without a prior screening. Another alternative that should
be considered is a border-waiver provision, similar to the one
included in the West Virginia law, designed to avoid placing
exhibitors at a competitive disadvantage in their respective ex-
hibition markets. 49
2. Advance Disclosure-Cancellation Provision
Another alternative to mandatory trade screening would be
to allow distributors the opportunity to blind bid any motion
picture but, at the same time, require them to make certain dis-
closures or guarantees regarding such pictures prior to negoti-
ations or bidding, and to provide exhibitors with a statutory
right of cancellation. Under this alternative, any exhibitor who
enters into an exhibition license under the blind bidding
method is given the right to cancel the license if, upon viewing
the completed motion picture, the exhibitor discovers that its
content does not conform to the pre-licensing information pro-
vided by its distributor. A bill introduced in the New Jersey
legislature has incorporated this alternative.5 ° Under the pro-
posed "Movie Suitability Advance Disclosure Act,'1 5' a distrib-
utor would be allowed to blind bid any motion picture provided
its bid solicitation included the audience to which the picture
147. See supra notes 70-81 and accompanying text.
148. S. C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-540 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982). See supra note 79 and
accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
150. The Missouri trade screening law partially incorporates this alternative. Al-
though not every motion picture may be blind bid, when it is allowed and undertaken,
the distributor must specify the audience to which the picture is directed and the an-
ticipated rating. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 407.357 (Vernon Supp. 1983). See supra notes 71-75
and accompanying text. The right to cancel exhibition licenses for non-conforming
blind bid pictures must also be made available to exhibitors under the Missouri law.
See infra note 157 and accompanying text.
151. Movie Suitability Advance Disclosure Act, Assembly No. 1767 (introduced July
8, 1982; not enacted) [hereinafter cited as Disclosure Act].
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is directed and the anticipated rating for the picture."2 If the
actual rating is more restrictive than the rating indicated by
the distributor, or if the motion picture does not substantially
conform to the pre-licensing information provided by the dis-
tributor, the exhibitor may void the exhibition license. 3 Fur-
thermore, if the distributor does not give the exhibitor
adequate notice that the picture does not conform to the antici-
pated rating or to other pre-licensing information, the distribu-
tor would be liable to the cancelling exhibitor for liquidated
damages.5 4 The legislative statement accompanying this bill
suggests the reasons for adopting this alternative over
mandatory trade screening:
This bill is based on the premise that there is not sufficient rea-
son to legislatively outlaw "blind" bidding, nor to single out
film exhibition for such a restriction while it is permitted in
many other areas of business such as bidding on unwritten
novels or memoirs for publication or film rights or bidding on
sealed auction lots of abandoned property or mineral rights of
unexplored geographical formations. Furthermore prior legis-
lative evidence has been persuasive that the public interest
would be adversely affected by the probability that first run
films would be released several weeks later in New Jersey than
in neighboring states if "blind" bidding were outlawed solely
on this side of the State boundary.
55
The advantage of this alternative is that it enables distribu-
tors to blind bid their motion pictures when it is necessary,
while protecting exhibitors from becoming contractually com-
mitted to unsuitable pictures. Although this alternative would
not provide exhibitors with the opportunity to review the qual-
ity and nature of a motion picture prior to licensing, it does
give a distributor an incentive to be as accurate and truthful as
possible with any pre-licensing information made available to
exhibitors, since any cancellations may leave that distributor
holding a completed picture without a screen to show it on at
the time of release. Exhibitors may, however, be reluctant to
exercise a right of cancellation for two reasons. First, for fear
that it will strain future business dealings with distributors.
Second, because, upon cancellation of an exhibition license,
the cancelling exhibitor would be placing himself in the unde-
152. Id. at § 3.
153. Id. at § 4a.
154. Id. at § 5b.
155. Id. at § 4.
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sirable position of having to search for a last minute replace-
ment picture to fill his screen. The Missouri trade screening
law, the only law that presently includes a cancellation provi-
sion, 6 provides some relief for the cancelling exhibitor by re-
quiring that every exhibition license entered into under blind
bidding contain a provision stating the amount of damages for
which the distributor is liable in the event the license is can-
celled.157 Although this provision still places a cancelling ex-
hibitor in the awkward position of having to search for a
replacement picture, it does attempt to provide compensation
for this inconvenience. The proposed New Jersey law also at-
tempts to provide relief for the cancelling exhibitor, however,
unlike the Missouri provision, the New Jersey proposal allows
a distributor to avoid liability for liquidated damages by pro-
viding an exhibitor with written notice at least fifteen days
prior to the scheduled exhibition date that the licensed motion
picture does not conform to pre-licensing disclosures. 158 This
provision is based on the premise that liquidated damages are
not warranted when a fifteen day advance notice is given, since
the exhibitor will then have sufficient time to secure a replace-
ment picture should he choose to cancel the exhibition license.
3. Alternative Statutory Remedies
The enactment of anti-deception or misrepresentation stat-
utes directed specifically at the motion picture licensing pro-
cess is another suggested alternative to mandatory trade
156. See supra note 150.
157. The Missouri law provides in relevant part:
A license agreement is voidable by the exhibitor if the released motion picture
does not substantially conform to the information provided by the distributor
about the motion picture in the invitation to bid, or if the rating given by the
Classification and Rating Administration is more restrictive than the rating
indicated by the distributor in the invitation to bid, and all money received by
the distributor from the exhibitor before the release of the motion picture
under the terms of the license agreement, shall be returned to the exhibitor
within seven days. All license agreements entered into as a result of blind
bidding shall contain a provision stating the amount of damages payable to the
exhibitor by the distributor in the event the license agreement is voided under
the terms of this section.
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 407.357 (Vernon Supp. 1983). A cancellation provision was also in-
cluded in the 1968 stipulation with the major distribution companies. Under this provi-
sion, a distributor was allowed to blind bid any motion picture provided the exhibition
license gave the exhibitor a right to cancel the license. See supra note 57.
158. Disclosure Act, supra note 151, at § 5.
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screening. 15 9 Under this alternative, distributors would be al-
lowed to blind bid their motion pictures, yet be liable for exhi-
bition losses incurred as a result of misleading representations
made to exhibitors.
For example, a New Mexico statute provides:
Any producer and/or distributor, who misrepresents, either
orally or otherwise, the merit or box office value of any motion
picture or pictures, at the time of sale or lease of any product,
or part thereof, shall be held accountable therefor and if such
producer and/or distributor shall refuse or fail to make adjust-
ment, the producer and/or distributor shall be civilly liable in
damages, both actual and punitive, to the person or persons
damaged, including all costs and attorneys' fees.'
60
However, until more statutes similar to the New Mexico stat-
ute are enacted, exhibitors must proceed against distributors
under their states' general misrepresentation and consumer
protection laws.
This alternative to mandatory trade screening would allow
distributors to blind bid their motion pictures, reduce the risk
of loss assumed by exhibitors from the alleged misleading na-
ture of the practice, and give distributors an incentive to pro-
vide exhibitors with accurate pre-licensing information. This
alternative would, however, fail to further the objective of facil-
itating informed licensing judgments by exhibitors as to the
commercial potential and audience suitability of motion pic-
tures prior to licensing. Moreover, the cost, time, and proof
problems associated with initiating such actions every time
box office expectations are not realized, as well as the negative
effect such actions may have on future business dealings with
distributors, would likely deter some exhibitors from seeking
such relief. 6
Presidio Enterprises, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Distribution
Corp. 162 provides an example as to how an exhibitor may pro-
ceed successfully against a blind bidding distributor under a
consumer protection statute. In this case, a Texas exhibitor
brought an action under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-
159. Brief for Appellees at 25, Associated Film Distribution Corp. v. Thornburgh, 683
F.2d 808 (3d Cir. 1982).
160. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-5-15 (1981).
161. For an example of a comprehensive statute directed specifically at the motion
picture licensing process, see N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 57-5-1 to -5-22 (1978).
162. No. A-79-CA-290 (W.D. Tex. filed July 25, 1983).
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Consumer Protection Act'63 against Warner Bros. for economic
losses allegedly sustained in connection with its exhibition of
the Warner Bros. motion picture Swarm in 1978. Since Texas
has not enacted a trade screening law, Warner Bros. was able
to license this picture under the blind bidding method. The
plaintiff-exhibitor based its winning bid on some very optimis-
tic representations communicated by Warner Bros. while the
picture was still being produced regarding the nature and po-
tential box office success of Swarm. 64 Upon exhibition, the
picture turned out to be a flop, which prompted the plaintiff-
exhibitor to bring its misrepresentation action against Warner
Bros. for the recovery of box office losses allegedly sustained
from the picture's exhibition. The jury returned a verdict for
the plaintiff-exhibitor and judgment was so rendered. 165 Al-
though this decision does not make the use of blind bidding
illegal in Texas or anywhere else, it does put blind bidding dis-
tributors on notice that the over-selling of unseen and unli-
censed motion pictures may no longer be tolerated by injured
exhibitors. Moreover, it establishes that an exhibitor can be
successful under state law in remedying wrongs that may oc-
cur under the blind bidding method.
4. Partial Screenings
Requiring a distributor to trade screen only a sample or por-
tion of every motion picture before licensing can begin is yet
another alternative to mandatory trade screening. When trade
screening is presently required, a distributor must show exhib-
itors the picture in its final form. This alternative would enable
distributors to advance license their pictures, while providing
exhibitors with the opportunity to sample the quality and na-
ture of pictures prior to licensing. However, since a few
selected film clips are not always indicative of the nature or
quality of the entire picture, it is questionable whether this
163. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.00-.63 (Vernon 1982). This lawsuit was also
based on common law fraud and negligent misrepresentation.
164. Fourth Amended Complaint at 3-19, Presidio Enterprises, Inc. v. Warner Bros.
Distribution Corp., No. A-79-CA-290 (W.D. Tex. filed Feb. 28, 1983). It was alleged in the
complaint that Warner Bros. promoted Swarm to exhibitors as being "bigger than The
Towering Inferno" and "more exciting than The Poseidon Adventure," two prior box
office blockbusters, when in fact Warner Bros. allegedly had undisclosed marketing
studies that indicated less than average audience interest in the picture and revenue
projections that were far short of blockbuster status. Id.
165. The case is presently being appealed.
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alternative would allow exhibitors to make informed licensing
decisions any better than blind bidding does.
B. Competitive Bidding Guidelines
As previously discussed, the majority of trade screening laws
contain competitive bidding guidelines that distributors are re-
quired to follow once bidding is initiated.'66 These guidelines
purport to insert elements of fairness and openness into the
competitive bidding process, while removing suspicion held by
exhibitors of the manipulation of bids by distributors.167 As
with a trade screening requirement, the least restrictive alter-
native to a regulated bidding process is no regulation. The
question posed is whether there is a legitimate need to disclose
what was once the private business dealings between two
groups. The trade screening laws of six states, while requiring
that motion pictures be trade screened, do not regulate the bid-
ding process in any manner.
68
Under an unrestricted bidding process, exhibitors must seek
relief under antitrust laws, fair trade laws, or other available
statutes from any unfair or discriminatory manipulation of
bids by distributors. The cost, time, and proof considerations
confronting exhibitors under this alternative may deter most
from initiating such actions. Moreover, the objectives of bring-
ing "orderliness and openness" to the licensing process and of
reducing suspicion of unfair dealings would not be achieved.
Although the present guidelines seem to provide the most ef-
fective and least restrictive means of furthering these objec-
tives, some of the guidelines may be overly burdensome with
respect to their rebidding provisions.
The rebidding provision is the section contained in bidding
guidelines that instructs distributors as to what licensing op-
tions are available to them if a satisfactory bid is not returned
by solicited exhibitors from the initial round of bidding.'69 Of
the three types of rebidding provisions, mandatory rebidding is
obviously the most burdensome on motion picture licensing
and distribution in that compliance may result in increased li-
censing delays and costs. In the absence of mandatory rebid-
166. See supra notes 41, 67-68 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
168. The six states are Georgia, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, Tennessee, and Utah. See
supra notes 60 and 118.
169. See supra notes 99-108 and accompanying text.
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ding, when distributors do not receive any acceptable bids
from their initial solicitation, they are free either to enter into
negotiations with selected exhibitors and promptly complete
licensing or to rebid the picture. Mandatory rebidding, how-
ever, takes away a distributor's negotiation option by requiring
additional, time-consuming rebiddings should the initial round
of bidding fail to produce any satisfactory bids. This tends to
delay the licensing of motion pictures beyond the time it takes
to comply with general trade screening and bidding require-
ments and to increase distribution costs. These considerations
may compel a distributor to accept a less than satisfactory bid
rather than resort to the time and cost of rebidding. Existing
mandatory rebidding provisions also fail to address the situa-
tion in which a distributor receives no bids from solicited ex-
hibitors. Apparently, in such instances, distributors must
rebid the picture to uninterested exhibitors until an acceptable
bid, or any bid for that matter, is received.
Such factors suggest that mandatory rebidding may be
overly restrictive. Legislators must determine whether there
is a demonstrated need to "lock" distributors into the bidding
process once it is undertaken. The optional and intermediate
rebidding provisions contained in several trade screening laws
offer less restrictive alternatives to mandatory rebidding. 7 ' In
addition, the intermediate rebidding provision makes it clear
to distributors that they may enter into negotiations if no bids
are returned from solicited exhibitors.
C. Restrictions on Advance and Guarantee Payments
As previously discussed, four trade screening laws indirectly
prohibit the use of guarantee payments in exhibition
licenses. 7 Two of these laws also prohibit the use of advance
payments. 7 2 These payments allow distributors to spread a
portion of the financial risks and market uncertainties associ-
ated with the distribution and exhibition of motion pictures to
the exhibition component, while providing exhibitors with
competitive licensing terms with which to improve their ability
to obtain exhibition licenses for popular motion pictures.
73
Advance payments also serve the function of providing distrib-
170. See supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 29-34.
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utors with a means of securing the performance of licensing
obligations by exhibitors.
17 4
The primary objectives underlying the enactment of trade
screening legislation are to bring fairness, openness, and com-
petition to the motion picture licensing process. Prohibiting
the use of advance and guarantee payments does not seem
necessary to achieve those objectives and is subject to criti-
cism. First, there is nothing inherently unfair or deceptive
about accepting or soliciting guarantee payments as a means of
fostering competition among exhibitors and of spreading the
risks associated with motion picture distribution and exhibi-
tion. Nor is it unfair to allow distributors the opportunity to
request refundable advance payments from exhibitors as a
means of securing the performance of licensing obligations.175
Many commercial relationships require the advancement of re-
turnable funds, particularly where poor performance of con-
tractual obligations by one of the parties is common. Second,
such restrictions may make it more difficult for new or small
exhibitors to enter and compete within established exhibition
markets.17 Third, by prohibiting these payments, distributors
and producers alone must bear the risk of financial loss from
unsuccessful motion pictures, of market uncertainties, and of
slow or nonperforming exhibitors. It is one thing to reduce the
risks assumed by exhibitors by restricting the use of blind bid-
ding, but it seems unreasonable for legislators to allow them to
operate nearly risk-free.
1 77
It might be argued that the payment of advances and guaran-
tees is unfair to exhibitors when made in conjunction with
blind bidding, since they are then advancing funds and guaran-
teeing returns for a product they have not had the opportunity
to examine. However, this risk seems to be an inherent aspect
of the motion picture business when considered with the risks
producers and distributors assume when they commit large
sums of money, in advance, for the rights to novels and plays
or for the production of pictures, relying solely on the reputa-
tions of writers, actors, producers, and directors. In addition,
174. See supra text accompanying note 35.
175. See discussion cited supra note 35.
176. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
177. Even when left unrestricted, the risks assumed by the large theatre chains are
sometimes minimal due to their ability to compel distributors to renegotiate terms on
unsuccessful motion pictures. See Statfeld, supra note 8, at 30-31.
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the risk assumed by exhibitors is reduced when a motion pic-
ture is trade screened prior to licensing since exhibitors, hav-
ing been given the opportunity to view the picture, may then
base their decision of whether and how much money should be
advanced or guaranteed on their own assessment and business
judgment. Accordingly, a more reasonable and less restrictive
alternative to complete prohibition would be to require that
motion pictures be trade screened before advance and guaran-
tee payments could be included in exhibition licenses. This al-
ternative might not only promote competition and "informed"
decisionmaking among exhibitors, but would also allow the
risks of the movie-making business to be shared among the en-
tire industry.7 " The fact that only four out of twenty-three
trade screening laws presently prohibit the use of advance and
guarantee payments further indicates that such restrictions
are neither necessary nor desirable.'79
V
Conclusion
The various forms of trade screening laws and the alterna-
tives discussed in this survey and analysis provide legislators
contemplating the enactment or revision of such legislation
with numerous drafting options. Regulation can be exten-
sive, 8 ° minimal,'81 or nonexistent; trade screening can be
made mandatory, waivable, or blind bidding can be numeri-
cally limited; rebidding can be made mandatory or optional;
and the use of guarantee and advance payments can be prohib-
ited or left unrestricted. The threshold issue legislators must
resolve is whether it is necessary and wise to regulate blind
and closed bidding.'82 Although trade screening laws have
been enacted in twenty-three states, the legislatures of many
178. A provision that requires distributors to make interest payments to exhibitors
on advance payments should also be considered by legislators. See generally Com-
ment, Interest on Security Deposits-Benefit or Burden to Tenant? 26 U.C.L.A. L. Rev.
396 (1978) (analysis of legislatively mandated interest payments on security deposits
held by landlords).
179. In addition, these restrictions may prove to be unconstitutional both as an im-
permissible restraint on price under the commerce clause (see Allied Artists Pictures
Corp., 679 F.2d at 663-665 (Ohio restrictions)) and as being overbroad under the first
amendment (see Associated Film Distribution Corp., 520 F. Supp. at 990, rev'd and re-
manded, 683 F.2d 808 (3d Cir. 1982) (Pennsylvania restrictions)).
180. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 203-1 to -11 (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984).
181. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 646.890 (1979); Disclosure Act, supra note 151.
182. See discussion cited supra notes 8 and 142.
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blind bidding states have been unconvinced that there is a
need to regulate the motion picture licensing process or that
the alleged unfairness resulting from blind and closed bidding
outweighs the marketing and distribution efficiencies associ-
ated with an unrestricted licensing process. If a determination
is made that such regulation is warranted, the objective of
lawmakers should be to draft a law that, while bringing "fair-
ness and openness" to the licensing process, does not unneces-
sarily burden that process. Consideration of the various
statutory provisions and alternatives discussed in this survey
will provide a basis for achieving such draftsmanship.

